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Introduction 
Consciously or unconsciously, land reforml he.s come to 
be regarded as 8 nowertul force,2 and indeed often as a con-
dition, tor bringing about socio-economic tmd nol1t1cel 
chenge in the countr1es now d1nlomat1cally referred to ee 
less developed. Thus, 1n eupnort of this clAim, no lees An 
lmuortant international forum then the U.N. has lent its sun-
nort to the nrominence land reform deserves a8 e strategy for 
development. 3 Indeed, given a nro~er concention, there is 
hardly any resson to believe otherwise. However, there 
a~~ears to be little consensus on the content, extent, end 
modus onerendi of land reform amongst both the nolltical 
leedereh1n of the lese develoned countries end the expert 
advisors th~+' influence oninions and decisions of home and 
foreign governments. Thus, tor exam~le, exce~t for nlati-
tudes ceIling for a -bssic restructuring" of eoc10-economic 
and nolit1cal institutions, the methods of acquis1tion of 
"pri v8te "1~~nd8 for redistribution, the lends to be effected 
by A land reform ~rogram, methode of oomnensetlon, whether 
comneneation should be m8~e, th~ resultant tenure structure, 
etc. are all subjects of controversy. More imnortantly, 
there i8 e nernlclouB absence of ettention given to the 
over-ell cond1 t10ns which must "Orecede and 8.ccomT}sny lend. 
reform ~rogr8m8. Coneequently, for some land reform 1s 
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merely the redistribution ot -property or rights in lend tor 
the benefit ot ema11 farmers and agricultural workere.,4 For 
others, land retor. 18 -any 1mprovement in the 1nst1tutions 
ot land tenure or agrioultural orgAnl~atlon.-S For at1ll 
others - and these are the ones that have been 8uccesaru1 -
land retorm has been v1ewed and 1mplemented 1n a much more 
comprehensive way than in Juat the mere redistribution ot 
land or the improve.ent ot agrar1an inst1tut1ons. In this 
latter conception, land retorm 18 one - no doubt a major -
weapon that 18 used 1n c10ae conJunotion with others suoh 88 
industrial1zation and planning to revamp exist1n oc10-
economio and political institut1ons. In th1 sense, land 
reform 1. 1ndeed more a strategy in social revc1utlon than 
one ot patchy reform. 
In Eth1onia, land reform in the aen8e ot any ot the 
8.bove 'Y·ariants has to come. Surely, the questions: 
-Who shall own the 1andt Who shall own the countrY81det· 6 
are too rund •• ental tor long to remain in the background. 
These are the central quest10ns 10 the wave of revolution. 
1n Atrioa, Aaia and Latin America.? And, aa Wililam H1nton 
aays, 
IThat revolution, tar tram 47ing away, 18 1ntensi-
tying. Sooner or later, all those countries where 
agriou1tural pro~uotion 1a a aa1n souroe ot wealth 
- and the relation between owners and producers a 
major .ouree ot oontliot - wl11 undergo great 
transformations. IS 
In theae c1rcu.atances, .oae .&7, the test ot 'good govern-
ment l i8 it. abi11ty to provide .olutions to theae burning 
questlons betore they attaln 'crisls prooortlona l9 rather 
than to merely hope that they would not ariee or that they 
would be answered by 80me halt-hearted and shoddy reform. 
Yet, that such is the extent of reforms or the attitude of 
power holders 1n feudal or sem1-feudal societ1es ls perfectly 
congruous with the incorrig1b1e but normal habit of rullng 
cla8sea who not only rely on the etflcacy of thelr mea.ns 
intension management (alded and abetted by their a111es), 
but a180 cannot seriously be expected to s1gn their own death 
certiticate by passing lava that are serioualy detrlmental or 
wholly deatructlve ot their cla8s lnter~sta except to make a 
modlcum of conceasions. 
MAklng neceeeary changes ln agrarian 1nstitutlons ls 
made particularly vexing tor the Et~iopian ruling class be-
cauae, ~re.ently aa in historlcal times, state and economlc 
power are almost excluslvely a function ot the control and 
mani~ulation ot land or its ~roduce. The land ln Ethlon1a haa 
been and remalns today the buls ot the organlzation ot state 
power and, theretore, the ln8trmaentot rule. Exce'Dt in the 
ca~1tal1at order ot economy which creates the 'sophistic 
11lu8ion that it has no regulation ot labour, that labour ia 
the reault ot tree and autonomous w111",10 property relation-
ship. in Ethiop1a as elaewhere where land 18 the major basis 
ot the organization ot 80ciety, are designed to regulate the 
d1stribut1on ot power among 1nstitutions and individuals and 
lAbour amongst those who hAve to pertorm it. Accordingly, 
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the Actus.l tiller of the land in Ethiopia is end has been the 
fundaments1 basis upon whlch, to use Philip A. Raunls exores-
sion, an "lnverted pyramid ot clalmants to his out'Out. Ifll 
rests end has rested in historical times. Hence, the neces-
sity to view real land reform as deenly affecting not only 
economic but Also 80ciel and nolitical reletlonehlns going 
down to the very foundations of the Ethioni8n SOCiety and '001-
Ity. Hence too, the necessity to view pronerty re1atlonshlns 
88 exnl81nlng the tenaclty with which nower holders cllng to 
existing err8n~ements And the re1uctence with which they 
ftn'Oro8ch, it and when they do, requests for eocia1 change. 
Since the egrerlan situation holds, 88 we sh81l show 
later, grave imo11catlons for deve1o"Oment and, 1n general, 
for the future course of events in Ethlonia, the questlon. of 
change in 8.gr8rla.n institutions cannot be nut off indefinite-
ly, even 1n sp1te of the reluctance of those who stand to gsln 
by the pernetuation of such institutions. Actually, even 
though the broad goals ot soclo-economic and nolltlcAl mod-
ernIzAtion may not, 8S we shall show later, be 8cconrollshed 
by the exnedlent of tenancy reform snd even lend redistribu-
tlon, land reform once a -forbIdden and subverslve N tonIc has 
now attained at leAst t)aper nrominence ln the develonment 
nrograms or the country. 
An an'D8.rent recogn1tlon or the need for land reform as 
8 strAtegy, and indeed 1n the words of the Second FIve Year 
Plan 8.S 8. s1ne qUA non, for develonment "nne8r~d for the fl,rst 
tlme 1n November of 1961, when the Em'Oeror 1n 8 rather lofty 
speech declared that: 
"The fundamental obstacle to the reallzation ot Ethio-
pla'. agrlcultural potential has been, simply stated, 
the lack ot secur1ty in the land. The produce ot the 
land must be enjoyed by h1m whose toll baa produced 
the crop. "12 
s 
The thlnking expressed in ~hia quotation represents a drama-
tic polnt of departure trom the sllence ot the centuries, and 
even trom the posit1on taken 1n the reg1me ot law ado~ted by 
the clvil code, promulgated only a year earller. 
Why a Budden sh1ft ot attitude toward land retorm? In 
December ot 1960, a group ot off1cers and civi11ans (one ot 
whom was an 1ntellectual) attempted and tailed to oust the 
Monarchy. During the very short period that the coup lasted, 
its leaders aeriously charged the Government with tailure to 
bring about "econoaic development, educat1on, and (better) 
l1v1ng standards,"l) deapite 1ts 'mountain ot promises.' 
Admittedly, the ~ol1tical statements ot the leaders ot the 
coup on land retorm were not particularly prominent, except 
tor ocoaaional references to the fact that "most ot the land 
i8 owned by a tev peoplell4 and despite the long-standing 
interest ot one ot thea in land retorm, which interest, in-
Cidentally, he attended to very well by distr1buting land to 
the landless in a certain district ot whlch he had been ap-
pOinted Governor pr10r to the coup.lS 
It i8 futile to argue whether the new leadershlp would 
have carried out land reto1'll 1 teelt, and ot what kind. The 
point here i8 that the COUl) vaa instrumental in providing the 
impetua for the idea ot land reform in Ethiopia for the t1rst 
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time. This is evident trom the hurry with whioh Is~eciall 
commlttees were appo1nted to lexplore ways and means ot 
apeedlng the development ot our nat10n in various flelds,116 
one ot which was the Land Reform Committee. 
More recently, 1and retorm has oecome llvened ty the 
desire to imoress international oplnlon, to appease progres-
slve elements in the bureaucracy and outside of it, and the 
necessity to obtain foreign aid. The latter pressure 18 
part1cularly powertul in providing grlst for the leglslat1ve 
mill. Currently, Sweden, the United States, and the World 
Bank have all embarked on agrlcultural development in the ex-
pectatlon that aome k1nd of land reform legislat10n w1ll soon 
become a reality. 
~iven the intens1ty and magn1tude ot the problem, ho~ 
ever, foreign ald or no ald, land reform must become a reality. 
By ita very nature, lend retorm 1nvolves to a greater or 
lesser degree, de~ending on one's view ot 1t, 8 re-orderlng 
ot -prO'J)erty torma and the norms that detine them. Th1s 18 
true whether such forms take pre-feudal and feudal character-
lstics. or are co~letely li~erated trom such characterist1cs. 
Although it has been seen ln many cases merely as a nolit1cal 
gimmick. the process at land reform has also been regarded as 
1ntimately related to the goal ot hastening the ~roce8s ot 
80cia1 and eoono.10 deve1opaent. As such, the re-ord.ered 
property forms must be JU8tified by the degree to wh1ch they 
~romote the process ot econom1c development and social well-
being. 
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The purpose ot this pAper is two-told: on the one 
hand, 1t attempts to exam1ne the nature ot property relation-
ships in land extant in Ethiop1a tOday w1th A v1ew to out-
l1ning their 1mplications tor development And, on the other, 
ofters a perspect1ve by which ex1st1ng relationships may be 
cr1ticized and attempts at rearranging such relat10nsh1na 
may be evaluated. 
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CHAPTDl J 
A Stat •• ent ot the Problem 
A. The Setting 
Ethiop1a 18 predom1nantly an agr1cultura1 country with 
AS much a8 ninety percent ot its labour toroe engaged in 
agr1culture.17 About two-thirds ot the gross domestic pro-
duct or1g1nates trom th18 sector. l8 
These tacta are not only enough to prove the importanoe 
ot agriculture in the Eth10pian economy, but also 1ndicate 
1ts low-level produot1v1ty. Indeed, tor most Eth1op1an peas-
ants, agriculture i8 not merely a way ot lite 8S it 1s otten 
bru1ted about, but more bleakly a means of 8urv1va1. Since 
agricultural product1vity 1s 80 very lOW, and the nature or 
property re1at10ns 80 1nequ1table, the 1iv1ng standards ot the 
ma.8es ot rural people 18 one ot the lowest 1n Atrica. Conse-
quently, poverty and 8uttering are Widespread; and only tive 
percent ot the popu1at10n is literate. l9 Med1cal servlces, 
concentrated 1n a tew b1g c1ties, and even then avallable as 
they are moatly to the landlords and ladles, and government 
employees, do not reach the broad masses of the neo~le. Only 
one percent ot the rural people can expect to be attended by 
a medical doctor dur1ng the1r l1te time. 20 
Perhaps, one ot the most discern1b1e ettects ot low 
agricultural produotion has been the cODstant necessity to 1m-
~ort toodstufts to provide raw mater1als tor ama11 leale 1n-
dustries, and to counteract acute grain shortages that have 
been occurring 1n the countr7 particularly in recent yeara. 21 
Reportedly, one ot these shortages vaa respons1ble tor 
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claimlng the lives 01' a8 many as 1.5 mlllion people. 22 
S1gn1tlcantly too, Ethlop1a has increasingly become a reOip-
ient 01' "tood tor relief" and 'char1ty" trom the Unlted 
States. 23 
Paradoxloa1ly, th1s state 01' a1'ta1rs happens 1n a coun-
try whose natural advantages ln the excellence ot her cllmate 
and the tertility ot her 8011, experts have fo';~· 8. long tlme 
now contirmed. or a total 01' potent1ally cultivable area of 
about 79 ml1lion hectares, only about seventeen percent 1s 
presently under cultlvatlon. 24 
No one c1alms that the task of transformlng traditlonal 
agrlculture trom its mould is a tacile bus.lness. Yet, that 
1s where the "battle tor long-term econom1c development wl11 
be won or lost."2S To wln the battle, the tramework wlthln 
whlch agriculture operates has to be la1d down. 
B. The Problem rurther Derined 
The basic problem 1. the low level 01' agricultural nrc-
duotlon. Thls same problem .. y be seen in lts many-sided 
sapecta:-
1) Methods 01' Cult1vatlon In general, tarming lmplements 
and methode of cult1vatl~n recall and are more appropriate 
tor b1blical times than tor the twentieth century. Tyolcally, 
'Equipment 1n general use 18 very pr1mltlve. The 
plow i8 the pr1nc1~.l tarm lmole.ent in the nlateau; 
the hoe 18 more common in the South. The typical 
nlow only turns the top 8011 And operatlon must be 
repeated .everal t1aes to prepare the ground tor 
planting. Snades and hoe. ot nUllerOU8 ehapea and 
aizes are (al80) uaed tor a variety ot chorea."26 
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Commercial tertilizers, new and better 8eed8, pest1cides, 
etc. are used on a tew co.mercial tarms but are virtually 
absent on the t1Pic61 peasant tarms. 27 
Many would frown upon the level at technology and the 
general practioe ot taraing but would find the explanation 
tor the.e in the illiteracy ot the peasants. Some, on the 
other hand, are impressed by the quality of Ethiopian ~eaB­
ants. Thus, Doreen Warriner saya that: 
lIn spite at constraints, the peasant bas developed 
var, sbrewd technique8 ot land and livestock manage-
ment, and th1. native knowled2e torma a very pro-
mi8ing baaia tor development:V28 
In tact, in terma ot tarming knowledge, the ~ea8ant 18 the 
most literate in Zth10~lan soc1ety. 
2) Parm Size Structure Broadly speaklog, the trad1tional 
agricultural structure 18 unaultable tor and inhibitive ot a 
viable agrioulture. In general, agriculture i8 organized 1n 
two land tenure 818t... - the 80-0alled cOllllunal ownership ot 
the Northern halt ot the country, and the large individual 
ownership ot the South. 
No atudy haa yet been undertaken by the GoV'dlJrnment to 
determine the degree ot concentration at ovner8bi~ ot land. 
Ho •• ver, information complled trom land tex registers confirms 
the cODllDon knowledge 10 Ethiopia that large chunks of idle 8l1d 
cultivated land belong to a rew individuals, the Crown, the 
Ohurch, and eyen the GoTernaent. According to the most recent 
report, the largeat holdings reoorded tor Rlate-Gul t*, Gebbar,· 
and Semon* are IS3S, 405, and 16) gaaba .. respeotivel1. 29 
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Even aore reveallng 18 a atudy made ot Hararghe Pro-
vince whloh ahova that .event7-~lve peroent o~ the aeasured 
land area in the whole province belongs to 0.2$ ot the total 
number ot landowner. 1n the Provlnce. 30 
rrom thl. ~act o~ conoentratlon ot ownershlp, aome have 
argued that the ~roble. ot underutl1izatlon ot re.ources 
ari8ing troa the luneoono.lo· slze of holdings 1s lout ot the 
quest1on.,'l The point thl~ arguaent oontuae., however, 1. 
the practical dlfterence between the ooncentratlon ot owner-
shlp and 1t. operatlonal 8ignlfioanoe. In other WOrd8, 
whether ln the North Where 'comaunal ownershlp' 18 sald to pre-
vail or 1n the South where extensive private ownershlp pre-
dominatea, owner8h1p has no signlfloance to the slze ot agri-
cultural operations. Consequent17, .1n both parte ot the 
countr.7, 81xt7-tive peroent of the pea.ant tarms are less than 
a heotare. 32 'rhus, tor 1n.tanee, both tigre which ia a 
I'or purpo.es ot tasat10D theae teras are detlned. as: 
• Riate-'Jult: heritable tenure under which the peraon enJoy-
ing suoh right ie entitled Ito oollect land tax pre.cribed 
bJ la.1 tro. persons holding lan41n the area to which his 
right extended. Out ot the .. ount so oollected, he was 
obliged to 1»87 • port10n ot 1t to the Goverruaent. 
• Gebber: individual ownerah1p under wh1ch • pereon holding 
....... oh right ])a78 land and other taxe. to the Gov8rmaent. 
• Sellon: lLand o.er which the Govern.ent baa ceded its 
rights ot taxation to the Church.-
• Gasha: 40 hectares. 
Por an understanding o~ theee propert7 relatione, ee. Chapter 
Ill. 
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Northern nrovince and ~etra which i8 a Southern one report 
thAt 45% and 41% re8~ectively or their holdIngs ra1l under 
the size-group of half a hectare. 33 Therefore, the s1ze ot 
farm structure 18 a very relevant 1ssue to the questIon of 
agriculturel ~roductlon. 
Further, the ~roblem ot low agrIcultural nroduct1on 1s 
compounded by the existence of large ldle lands 1n the nstr1-
mony or a rew individuAls while the small farmers nartlcu1ar-
1y 1n the North rret 1t out under the double nreS8ure of 8 
rieing ~ODulatipn and dw1ndling fert1lity of the soll. 
3) Agricultural Surolus and Ca'01tal Accumulat10n It 1s 
obv10us that the low level ot techn1que extant in the subs1s-
tence sector, the unecono.lc 8I~e ot farm structure, and the 
existenoe of large idle lands are all not only irrational but 
a180 1nh1bitive ot raD1d c8nltal accumulation. 
Moreover, rente, tIthe (a8ra~), tees, etc. ~81d to the 
cla88 ot landowners, and var10us torms ot taxe@ na1d to the 
Church and other r1ght holders ot a sImilar tyne are all 
sources ot Dotent1sl lurolus capable ot be1ng ted back Into 
agr1culture and invested in more l)roduct1ve economIc actIv'.-
tIel 1n other sectors ot the economy. 
Why the landlords, the Churoh, and other rI~ht-holdere 
do not undertake nroduct1ve act1v1ties either In agriculture 
or in other seotors ot the economy, we shall attemnt to 
exnlain later. 
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Obviou8l~, thi8 brief outline cannot pretend to ex-
hauat the problema ot Ethiopia's agricultural development or 
the miserable standard of 11ving of ita people. It i8 merely 
an attempt bl • non-economist to concentrate on 80me aspecta 
or the J)roble.. 111 an effort to relate them tentatively to 
their lnstitutional setting. 
Manl authors have, by the use of What!. Szentes haa 
called the 'subtraction a~roach,' tound the explanation tor 
the phenOilenon of un4erdevelopaent in the shortage ot oapi tal, 
the 1aok ot natural resource., etc., and in the absence ot a 
'long llst of quallties, propenaltles, motivatlon., and incen-
tives that, 1n contrast to tbe advanoed countries, are mJIBing 
in the underdev.loJ)ed ••• -34 (z.t,ha81s in the original). SOIDe 
11ke MoClelland have gone ad ab.urdua and tound the explana-
tion 1n the absence of what the latter c8118 In-Aehievement. 1 3S 
However, tbe 'loglc' ot theae explanations 8a 8zent.8 'POinte 
out 1s •• re17 to 8., that the advanoed countries are advanced 
b.cau~e their nationals po..... economica1ll ap~ropriAte 
8001a1 and pS1chological behartors. Qui te a-part trom being 
hope1 ••• ly tautological and e~n raclal, such explanatIons are 
incapable ot anewering, ln the one c.se, the question ot how 
8uch attitude. 0 ... to be pos •••• ed b1 the advanced countries 
in the tir.t ~lace,)6 and 1n the other, ot how suro1u. 18 ~ro­
duoed, who approprlate. lt, and how .uoh surplus 1. used. 3? 
In An7 di.cus.lon of the deve1o-pment process, the social 
relatione of -production, ot Which propertf relationship. Are 
e major a.~ect, tigure .. one ot the moet important and crucial 
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determinants or the tavourabll1ty or unravourabl11ty ot the 
mode ot production within wh1ch productIon and soc1a1 ex1s-
tence take place. And to the extent that land reform, in-
volvIng as it doe8 a change in property relat1onships, mar 
have a role to play in the development process, the question 
ot what propert7 relationships are .ost conducive to develop-
ment becomes unquestionably I~rtant. By property re1at1on-
ships we under.tand more thaft the nuaerua clausus ot real 
rlghts; we include 1n It 80clal stratltication, the distrIbu-
tlon ot ~oyert and tbe •• terlal and oultural conditlons ot 
the tolllng pea.ant ....... 
, 15 
~e Nature ot Property Relatlon8hlp. 
A. Introductory: 
It cannot but be adIlltted that the torlla and the nature 
ot property relationships in Boclety are generally histori-
ca111 s~ecitic to the ~rev.iling mode ot ~roductlon. As 
Marx's tamous atate.ent ba8 it, 
lIn the soc181 production ot their eXistenoe, men 
inevitably enter into det1nlte relations, whloh 
are independent ot their wll1, n ... l, relatione 
ot production appropriate to • given .tage ot 
deyelopaent ot their •• terial torces ot ~roduc­
tlon. l ,a 
On this Tie., property relationship. are the legal (or cU8tom~ 
a.ry, a8 the ca.e JDa7 be) expressions ot the relations ot llro-
duction. Thus, JUBt as it 18 unlikely to tind private ~ro­
perty in land, tor example, ln pre-historic times, so one does 
not tind pr~erty burdened with teudal obllgations in can1tal-
ist or soc1alist society. 
While this much .87 be a4altted, the general stage ot 
development, and therefore the general mode ot vroduction a 
society baa attained, partloularly whether a society 1. teuda1 
in the Western senae 1s otten the subJeot ot debate. !hoBe 
who ••• teudalls. on17 .. a Western torm ot aoclal, economic 
and ~olitical organization are reluctant to tind such a aYBtem 
e18ewhere. Otten this 18 done by iaolatlng certain unique 
Weatern European teature. merel7 to contirm th~ir absence in 
other locleties. Accord1ngly, the .oat important teature 1n 
'Western teuda11.a" i. aeen in the tact that teudal inat1tu-
tiona aroae out at 8 need tor protection, which in turn gave 
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rise to the -protective relatlon8hip set up by one tree man 
over another' called co .. endatlon.J9 
80 tor eX88ple, dlacu8stng the property inatitutions or 
Perala, Laabton talls to tind teudaiis. here precisely because 
-Whereas a contractual relatlonship vaa an e8aentla1 charac-
teristic ot (W.stern Peuda11 •• ), the element or contract never 
bec .. e a reature ot the Igt.,~ an institution str1kingly 
similar, it not iaentlcal, to Ethiopla-. ~, .e ve shall aee 
subsequently. 
Obviously, auch a aetinitlon y1elds merely a Juridlcal 
relation between a y ... a1 and • prlnee and, lndeed, may be no 
more than ot ornaaental value to the teudal alatem as a mode 
ot production ainee It vas not the idea ot contractual rela-
tionshlp that vaa the motive torce 10 changing teudal Europe. 
Maurlce Dobb, on the other hand, baa convincingly lald the em-
phasl. on -the relation between the direot producer ••• and hi. 
lmmed1ate superlor or overlOrd and (on) the aocial-economic 
content ot the obllgatlon which oonnecta them. 141 The great 
merit ot .uch a detinition 11e8 in ita lsolation ot the domin-
ant relation ot production which nourishes ln ltselt the 
ele.ents ot change in the systea. Furthermore, thla detini-
tlon, unlike those which ylev European teuda118m 8S 8 
"dlst1nct1ve genu.' by eap~lz1ng 'Juridlcal character1stics 
and dlrterentla,' admits ot variations in the way 1n which 
surplua product i. a~roprl.ted trom the dlrect nroducers. 42 
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B. Pro2erty Relations at the Peaaant ~evel 
In the North: The tundamentAl nro~erty institution 
here is expressed by the term ~ (in AlLluirlc) and Rlat! 
(In Tlgrlgna). frequently, although ai.tatenly, the aystem 
in which this torm ot property oooura haa been called com-
munal. Under thl& sy&tem ot rlghts, any landholdlng 1. 
theoretlcally traced back to • Ifirst settler l or -foundlng 
tather-. Any aeaber ot a taal1y that oan trace back his 
lineage to such a progenltor 1s thus entitled to the perpetual 
uae and enJoyaent ot the land. !hus, every rist right 1s 
l~.o facto held by hereditary right. Otten, 8inee land can 
be lnherlted cognatlca11y, a peraon 8ay hold plota ot land in 
d1tterent parlahea. Indeed, he .. y even step lnto h1s wlte l s 
rlghta to ausaent the a1Ee and Dumber ot his hold1ng8. Unlike 
elsewhere ln Atrica, no 'cbiets- are re8~on81b1e tor the al-
location ot righta in land. 
Noy, the co_on view ldeallEed especlally by anthropo-
10glat8, and those who fashion the1r opin1ons atter them 18 
that land rlghts under suoh a system belong to "the living, 
the dead, and the unborn'. Ascr1bing land right8 to the dead 
18 .a impossible a Dr~o81t1on a. it i. absurd. The nurno8e 
ot the ideology, undoubtedl7 toraed At a time when land was 
bount1ful in relation tQ populatlon, la aerely to convey the 
idea that land oannot be 801d, a8 indeed it 18 rarely 80ld. 
As a result, 80ae have been led to believe that "ownershlp 
here 18 8ui generls·. 4) Even the briefest encounter wlth 
Engel l • "!he origin ot the ~ami17, pr1vate property and the 
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State' ls enough to dispel the notlon that ownershlp i8 sui 
ganeri8 here. But let us exaa1ne the clata a little more 
c108ely 8ince tro. a misunderstanding o~ the working rule. ot 
tradit10nal property relationa (or bJ deliberate caloulations) 
have flowed inappropriate policy prescr1ptions. One auch 
polioy presoription in Ethiopia haa been (although not yet 1m-
p1emented) a pro~ ot indlvldua1ization44 of pro~erty in 
land in the Western t.-hion, aa it mere lndividualization 
would by itlelt 40 the triok of increased agrioultural ~ro­
duotion. 
!he oonoept ot owner8h1~ i8 detined 1n moat civil law 
jurisdiotione as Ithe right ot enjoJing and disposing ot things 
1n the moat absolute aanner l .abject to restrictions impo8ed 
by 18 •• 45 As suoh, the right ot ovnersh1~ is otten rendered 
ln teras of it. three abeolute oharacteristic.: absoluteness, 
exclusivene.a, and ~rp.tulty. EYen though the abaolutene8S 
ot the right ot owner.hip i. frequently qua1if1ed by the tinal 
phraae Wh10h admits or re.triotions 1aposed by 18.,46 the real 
glet, in praotice, ot the abaolutene8. of the right relAtes to 
its three attributes: the Ir 1ght l • ot use and enjoyment, the 
Ir1ght· at abandonment, and the Iright l ot alienation inter-
vivos or mortis causa. 
• As Earl Renner ha. ~ointed out, 1t 18 incorrect to "dissect 
ownership into 1nd1Yidualize4 ~wers" Just .. it would be to 
Idie.olve the right ot peraonal liberty into the freedom to 
sleep, to tat. 8. walt, to .ate a .~ or the oroas l , etc. 
Thue the right ot owner.h1p 18 one r1ght - not a bundle ot 
r1ghts. 
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The exclusive quality ot the right ot ownership as.urea 
the owner IS privative interest in the property which does not 
permit ot equal simultaneous ownership by more than one pe~ 
8onl.47 Obvioua1y, this 1. not to say that two or more persons 
oannot own a th1ng Jointly_ But it i8 to say that in no case 
can each at them be the tull owner ot the thlng at the same 
ti ••• 
"inaIly, the perpetual character ot the right at owner--
ship relates to the aba.noe ot any limit in time on its exer-
cis., 1.e. there is no such thing aa Itemporary ownerahip.148 
How, in the Ethiopian case where the eo-called communal 
tenure preval1s, no aeriOU8 ob.erver can deny the customary 
principle encountered and expressed in these areas in the for-
mula: lBeahih Ametu Le_ale Ristul •• aning that leven atter 
the lapse ot a thousand l'eara, the land belongs to him who is 
entitled to itl. On the standard characteristic at the right 
ot ownerahl~ being perpetual, i.e. unlimited in tlme, this 
prinoiple expreases perpetuity even more tellingly and suo-
oinctly than the very clvil law notion ot ownership whloh has 
tatherea Arts.1204tt ot our oivil code. In practice, it 18 
tru., the appllcation of thls principle 1s sO complex, arising 
malnly froa the praotioe whereby persons - and they are 80 
many - ola1. rights on both a14e8 ot their ancestors, that 
the d1.tlnotion Hoben baa drawn 1s valid: 
lIn lta most general sense, riat rlght refers to 
the r1ght a person has to a share of the land 
f1rst held by any ot his or her ancestors 1n any 
line ot descent. In 1ts most restrlcted aen8e, 
by contrast lt reters to a spec1t1c t1eld held 
by virtue ot 8Uch a recognlzed right i .49 
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Legally, however, whether a person can successtully convert 
his cla1m ot 'rist rlght l into a tangible -specitic tleld' is 
a question ot proot, i.e. hls ablilty to valldate hle cla1m 
to tltle, and not a consideration capable ot exclud1ng one or 
the oharacterist1cs ot ownershlp, albe1 t !bel'"D't in torm and 
strength at the aoment. 
Purthermore, rist rights are not collectively exerclsed. 
They are neither co11ect1'9'e17 owned nor collectively worked. 
The tenancity with which r1st rights are detended and the ex-
clusiveness "hereby each rist land forma "an independent 
centre ot production' i.e. the rlat owner tarms hie lend or 
leavee it idle, makes his 01111 investment decls10n8, etc., 
"hich operations constitute, in part, the exclusive and abso-
lute qualities ot ownership, hardly lends credence to the 
notion ot communa11ty, particularly since r1at rlghts rarely 
revert even to the neareat ot kin let alone to a notional 
C olUllUlli ty • 
Nevertheless, we are tar trom asserting that this system 
aoknowledges as yet indiv1dual ownership ln the sense detined 
above. Clearly, the abeence (or relatlve rarity) ot sales in 
land - a 81gnlf1cant characteristlc of the absolute quality of 
ownershlp - createe the obvious alasing link to a mature right 
ot ownershlp. However, we are arguing that the absence or 
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thi8 element i8 far from enough to warrant the notion that 
'ownership i8 sui generi8' or 40es not exlst. For the oonoept 
ot ownershlp, whioh evolved into a mature torm - the legal 
form in which it i8 found now, even though event8 have again 
oVertaken the functlonal norms defining itSO - generally only 
atter the breakdown of teudal soolety and its replacement by 
that ot the market, i8 historically specltic to the economic 
and soclal condltions in which it c.ame to be recogn1zed as such. 
The signiticance ot the right ot ownershlp must not be under-
stood by whether the bill of norms by whlch lt is detined i8 in 
practice sat18fled or not. Rather, lts slgnlflcance lie8 in 
the 'unlimited P0881billtles" ot use and disposal, whatever 
the manner, it otters the indlv1dual. And the extent to which 
the rlght ot ownershlp may be u8ed and d18posed 18 8 funct10n 
ot the level ot maturlty ot the economy. In subs1stence eco-
nomles 8uch as 1n Eth1opia, as 18 well known, production 1s 
largely tor U8e - not the market - both by the direct producers 
and, in the Ethlopian caae, by a teudal 01a88. Hence, one ot 
the pos8ibi11ties tor disposal i.e. alienation inter-v1vos or 
morti8 causa i8 largely absent in the Rist system because ot 
the nature ot the economy which does not aftord a ready mar-ket 
not only for the land but even tor the produce thereot, and 
because ot the 80c1al need tor the continuity ot the family 
organized around and predicated upon land and land rights. 
Henoe too the f1erce opposit1on by ri8t ownera to anything 
that amacke o~ eyentuation 10 land sales. It 1B this misappre-
hension that the anthro~olig1Bt betrays when he den1es the 
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exlstence ot owner8hlp in Northern Ethiopia or where he 
regArds lt 88 "au1 generl. 1 on the basis ot an unhiatorloal 
method of analyais. 
Vlewed historlcally, however, there ia ot course owner-
Ihip although 1imita are put on 1ta exercise by the under-
developed nature ot the economy and the t8.a1ta ot aocial and 
famillal organizatlon lt 18 called upon to serve. As such, 
Rlat 18 the medium by whlch aocl&1 and economic relationships 
are express.d, on a horlzontal plane between one peasant and 
another. Aa a legal instltution, too, lt 8erves the function 
of etfectlng the allocatlon and the aoolal regulat10n ot the 
major 80uroe ot wealth - land. It is thus the tundamental 
baal. upon which the peasant undertakes product1ve work And 
via which he particlpates in the national economy. 
Thus, we have at the root ot the socio-economic system 
a common human denominator - the small peasant ~ tarming h1e 
own plece ot land, tormlng al it doe8 an "independent centre 
ot product1on" , w1th very 11ttle specia11zation and exchange. 
In the South: The analogue ot the peasant in the North 
1s the .hare-cro~er In the South. Share-cropping tenancy is 
'Predomlnantly an agrarian teature ot the 8edentary population 
ot the elght (out ot 14) nrov1nces ot Southern Eth1op1a. 
Whereas the peasant in the North may have the ~sycholog1cAl 
aatiltaetlon ot contidently asserting that Ito be landless ls 
to be aubhuman
'
,5l hi. counterpart in the South has to toll on 
a plece of land that he used to own but no longer does. In the 
a 
North, as we aaw above, r1st 18 Boclo-econom1c and legal 
2) 
1nat1tution unlt1ng the peasants, ln the South it unltes not 
the tillers ot the land but ita owners. Here, the tillers 
are united by the instltut10n ot tenancy, and aa in the North 
each wlth hia own aaa11 piece ot land with very little market 
relatlona. 
The incidence ot tenanoy 1s high and otten takes a 
character lnconsistent with human dignlty. That thia i8 80 ls 
s functlon ot the hiatory ot thia part ot the country 1n the 
late nineteenth century. In the wake ot Emperor Mene11k II's 
conquest ot the Southern provincea, ocourred a wave or near-
tull Beale appropriation ot land. In the course of this con-
quest Men.11k wrote extensively upon the South, almo8t as it 
on a olean slate, the teudal property relat10nships of the 
North and Bome novel variants. As 8. pre11ll1nary measure, up-
warda ot two-thirds ot the land waa cont1scated and the right-
tul owners reduced, at one stroke, to the atatus ot aerta. 52 
The conditions ot sertdom were 80 brutal that Atework Gebrey-
8.US, a chronicler at the time, wrote: 
'When Christiana are thua terr1bly oppressed by 
their brother Christiana ,one can lIIag1ne the 
condition ot the poor pagans who are treated 
11ke doga.'S3 . 
Under such a atatue, the peasant was required to pertorm in-
numerable obligation. tor the overlords, including the payment 
of "rent', cultivating their lands, carrying wood and w8ter 
tor them, and in general pertor3ing any other kinds of labour 
eerv1aee. Indeed th1s practice Y8S nothing unfami11ar to the 
Northern ~eaaant too. Of the latter, it has been sald: 
• ••• the •• Telleina are l1ke oame18, they alway. 
cry, "eep and groan when they are loaded, but ln 
the end they rlae w1th the burden that 1. put on 
thell and car17 1 t , • S4 
not mindful that 
• ••• It la also true that they rail wlth their 
burden and then the owner 108e8 both the camel 
and the load, ·SS 
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not to .entlon that, when they choose J they __ y also throw 
otr the burden altogether. 
80m8 ot the worst teature. ot thi. s1 tuat10n have been 
gradual17 re.oved 1n the laat thirty to torty years. Yet, 
auoh remalns ot the preYlou. soclal and econoa10 condit10ns ot 
the landles. pe .. antry that even today, the rendering ot per-
.onal serylce. 'tor no r_uneratlon continue. unabated. 56 Not 
on17 do tenant. haYe to entertain thelr abeentee landlords 
with viotual. when the latter tancy to Tialt their taraa, but 
a180 bear the obllgation to transport the landlords' ahare ot 
the orop to • de.tlnatlon t.po.ed by the latter.S1 No wonder 
then that a group o't tenants liv1ng onl1 45 kilometre. troll 
the natlon'. capl tal, where one would expect the inrluence. 
ot aodemizatioD to have taken root, could with b1tterne •• 
aummarlze thelr sltuatlon and that or other. by the .tatement: 
'Ch1a!8l1a Malet Aaker na.·S8 .. tenancy aeana servitude. 
Apart 'troa the reaaon. expre8.e4 above, the rollowing 
bear out the stateaent. 
Plrat17, the paJaent o't 'rent' calculated a. a tixed 
share ot the produce ot the land, whlch varle. between one-
third and one-hal't ot the crop beara very little or no relation 
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either to the productivity of the land, or to the costs in-
curred by the tenant. Rent 1& detera1ned by custom - custom 
whioh goes back to the time wben the teudal claas imposed all 
kinds ot dues. on a subject peasantr7. In other words, suoh 
payaents do not r.~ect .uoh leee .mbody leoonom1c rent', 
arrived at by the ru1es ot the la. ot supply and demand. 'l'he 
civil oode speaks, therefore, ot a legal fiction when it reters 
to th1s aa a 'oontract or 1e88e l • 59 
Seoondly, the p.,aent ot tithe commonly known as Aarat 
in Ethiopia - a teudal legal institutlon par excellence - 18 
Itlll part ot the tenant's obl1gation to the landlord. ~o be 
sure, thls obligatlon ... legal17 supooaed to encumber land-
ownership. Even the clrtl code had m.de the landlord respon-
slble tor the paJaent ot the 'burden charging the immovable.,60 
More reoently, the Agrlcul tural Income Tax Proclaa.tlon ot 1967 
had al80 the ~urpose ot abo1lshing the pr8ctlce~1 In tact, 
ho"ever, .11 these haft been nothing lIore tban Iphantom' legis-
lation. Beoaule ot the ev1dently ... yaetrloal nature ot the 
loolo-econo.l0 and political structure pervasive 1n the socie-
ty, lt haa been historic8ll,. 8. well a. contemporaneously an 
e.IY matter tor the landown1ng 0188. to .hitt their obl1gation 
to their tenantl, Dot merel,. to ottset 8Uch obllgation but 
even to .ate ~rotlt on 1t: 
'Where the .arket value ot the -.. rat' (~a1d in nro-
duce) ••• exoeed. the tax 1n lieu ot tl the, the land-
lord Ihltt. to the tenant .ore than the tu. The 
1ikel1hood ot th1. i. high; tor the market value ot 
a tenth ot the gro •• output on a gaaha (40 hectarea) 
ot tertlle land 18 11ke1,. to exoeed the maximum tax 
1n lieu ot tithe (l.e. Eth.t3S.00)1.62 
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Add to this the tact that ln man1 ca888, the tenant doe8 have 
to pay also tees to obtain or renew tenancy rlghts tram the 
landlord or hl. agent. In one area, the amount ot suoh pay-
ment ranged between Eth •• 20 and t40 per hectare ot land. 6) 
'l'h1rdlJ', notwithstanding the tact tbat tenanc1es aay oc-
casionally be ot long duration - indicatlng the unavallability 
ot alternative eOODOillc OJ)!,ortunlties - the landlord has the 
I 
right conaecrated bJ' cuetoa to evict h1. tenant w1th 1mpu~1ty 
and on an,. pretext 80 auch 80 that even a slight misunder-
standing between the two 18 enough reason for forthwith evic-
t lon. For. penon tor whoa dally bread 18 more lJll)ortant 
than expensive litigation in the entangled Judicial system ot 
Ethiopia, the ohoice 18 clear - he seeks no reinstatement nor 
any compensatlon - even when the clvil code has provided 80me 
remedles. 64 But these remedies cannot reaoh the tenant. tor 
a Jlore tund8llental reason. 
The mistake ot viewing underdevelopment 88 the absence 
in the underdeveloped countries oertain features prevalent 
in the advanced one. does not end wlth development economist, 
alone. It i8 a fallacy o~ their Jurist colleague. too. The 
civll code ot Ethiop1a is a product ot one such tallacy. Ita 
chlef weakness on the .atter ot tenancy relationsblns 18 the 
inoorrect aS8umption that such re1stionshlpa are .u.oe~t1ble 
of regulation under a torau1a of 'freedom ot contract-, a 
tormula unhletoricallJ engratted essentially A feudal mode 
ot productlon. By ado~t1ng such tormula the code regards 
the ''Partle.- to agr1cultural tenancy relationshlps a8 
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p08sessing equal bargaining power. FreedOil ot contraot, with 
its twin-brother ot peraonal liberty - both products ot nin~ 
teenth centur7 liberalls. - preswpposes equallty, at least 
ideologically. But Wbere one ot the ~arties i8 1n a 80c1ally, 
eeonomlca11y, and ~litlcally subservient positlon as the ~ea8-
ant is in Ethiopia - where even under the constitution he ia 
a subject rather than a Oitizen - one Bust join a United 
Nations StudT's rea1n4er and conclude that • ••• the lde.ot 
equality before the law belng consequently much weaker ••• 
the 11kelihood ot a tenant actively seeklng to achieve rights 
the law contera on hl. ia a alight one '6S indeed. 
c. Relatlona o~ Aunrooriatlon and Authorlty 
... ----.------~ 
It haa been pointed out that the pr1ury oondition ot 
anJ sort ot avoropriatlon of the labour ot others (even when 
thi8 18 acco.pll.bed b7 robberJ) 18 the ~aslbll1tl at auch 
a~propr1at1on 1.e. the Doa.lbi1ity ot ~roductlon ot a certaln 
amount ot 8urolu. labour and aurolu8 product. 66 Indeed, w1th-
out the generation by • soelo-economic syetem ot 8urnlus ~ro­
duct, no civllilatloD, no progress 18 made possible. Also, 
the tact that the surplus vr04uc~ of one grou~ is appropr1ated 
by another •• ans that there auat be 80me authorl tl cApable ot 
entorclng and aanction1Dg suoh approprlation. Thus, a~ro­
~riatlon ls vredlcete4 upon the ~s.e.8ion or such authority 
and the attainment by soclety ot • certa1n level or ~roduc­
tlvlt1. Wlthout thes., clas. exploltation 18 1~oa81ble.67 
From this perspective, it 18 large17 irrelevant to the 
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nossess1ng clsss, whether relat10ns o~ appropriation and 
author1ty were maintained upon the neasantry through the 
medium o~ r1st or sh8re-crooping tenancy 80 long a8 the con-
tent and function of appropriation remained the same or sub-
stantially the same. Coneequently, 1n Eth1opia, whether in 
the North where rist 'Orevails or in the South where shar~ 
cronning tenancy and even small ~ea8ant nronrietorship exists, 
the function of a~ropr1ation of surolus has been substan-
t1ally uni~orm in each o~ theae cases. Thus,8S Margery 
Perham Observed about three decades a~o: 
-This meant thst the cultivator must, as the 
Ethiopians themselves e~~resa it, 'carry upon 
his shoulders' all that very large nronortion 
of the pOTlulation which had withdrawn themselves 
~rom work on the land •••• The elaborate systems 
of lend tenure and of tribute with all their 
nrovlncial variatione represent only the differ-
ent means by which his services and produce were 
utilized by the Government and by other classes.-68 
Otten many ob8ervers have been betuddleJ by the great dlver-
slty of tenure forms 80 much so that some have even snoken of 
one-hundred one -types of ovnershlp·69 existing only in one 
Ares ot the oountry while others have attributed thp ownerehin 
of the land in the entire country to the Emneror. 70 Such 
stetements lire engendered otten by a tailure to dl!<tlnguish 
between the rights ot the auoroor1ator8 and the Boclo-econo-
mic obligations imnosed unon the t1llers ot the lend. When 
this is avoided, we tlnd at the fountainhead ot [thlonlen 
feudal ~ronerty relation8hins the nower of the Em~erore to 
grant, 8B they did, rights in land such 88 Me.derie I and even 
ownershin burdened with ~eud81 obll~etions such e8 the duty 
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to transport artillery, tents, etc. and r1ghts to surplus 
product such aa Semon, Rlate-Gul!, Gul t, and Ferea.egnet. 
These terms wl11 beoOJle olear subsequently, the easential 
point to aee 18 that although the rights ot the persons or 
1natltut1ons ent1tled to aurplus toOk d1fterent appellatlona, 
the t1llers ot the land were the ones, in the tinal analY8is, 
on whom thea. obligatlons were llRPoaed. As 1n every teudal 
society, the ~ower to appro~riate aurplus trom the t1l1era, 
and the author1ty to do.ln,ate them vested in any person or 
institutlon had to be Justlfled 1n the tinal analys18 by a 
specif1c tora ot servioe to the orown. This 1s a cornerstone 
ot feudal relationshlp,a, and to lt there ap-peara to be hardly 
any exception. Prom the atandpoint ot the tillers, however, 
the orig1n ot their 80clo-econo.l0 and ~olltloal 8ubJugation 
can be noth1ng else but force as wltnesa the military conquest 
ot the South by Menel1k's forcea in the nineteenth century. 
There have been -.DY granta of right8 in historical 
times, but here only the chlef torma that have subs1sted and 
oontinue to exist 1n a modern dres8 wll1 be discussed. 
Gult 
-
Bf tar the most ~erya.iY. and the queen of all feudal 
property r.lation.h1~8 was Gult. Suoh right vas usually 
granted to i.,ortant 'Per.onages in return tor military service, 
and to individual churohes for the propitiation ot God. When 
the right was heritable, it aeeae to have been known 88 Rlete-
Gult. The comb1nation or the teras -Ri8t l ~lying herita-
bility and IGultl (literally meaning lintemosed between two 
)0 
d1rectly connected thingsl)?1 indicating intermed1acy renders 
such interpretation correct. Th1s difterence may perhaps ex-
pla1n the relative rar1ty ot the tormer and the relative 
abundance ot the latter in present-day Ethiopia. In both 
case8, however, the easence of the right consisted in the ap-
propriatIon ot surplus product trom the peasantry but never 
any interest over the land itselt. As A ~~'UT) ot Eritrean 
peasante the.selves correct17 pointed out, the Em~eror could 
create Gult right. over any land, but could never intertere 
wlth their ri8t rights.72 As such, Gult wes mainly the medium 
by which the peasants' eurplus 1fIUI extracted, and trom the 
Emperors' polnt ot vlew, the formula by which the support and 
alleglance of the churches and nobles W88 secured and their 
.alntenance provided. In an economy where the use ot money 
was undeveloped, to sal the least, the formula or Gult nrc-
vlded the .eane by whlch the serTiees ot 8uch ~erson8 and insti-
tutions may be paid. 
Such. relation ot a~rODri.tIon vent hand in hand with 
8 relation ot authorlty. Ae such, Gult was also an instru-
ment ot rule. Aa Hoben has correctly observed, 
l(J.ul t rights were thu8 tar aore than Just a tyoe 
ot land tenure. They were an integral part or 
the Amhara (Ethio~lan) teudal nolity tor they 
rep~e.ented the granting away by a regIonal ruler 
ot an lmnortant part of hie (the state's) taxa-
tional, Jurldical and adm1nistratlve authority".?) 
Consequently, not only could the Emperore and regional rulers 
(by derived authority) create Gult in any nart ot the country, 
but also 1n tact-virtually all arable and 1nhabited land was 
held by someone or some institutIon 8S 2Y1!.74 There WAS no 
)1 
land without a aasterl.?S From such a Jurldical, political, 
and adm1ni8tratlve point ot vantage, the Gu1t holder was 
actually an autocrat ln h1s own r1ght virtually replicat1ng 
at the reglona1 level the absolute pover ot the Emperor at the 
top. Correspondlngly, the peasant.y wae 8ubJect to an intin-
ite number ot due. and obllgatlons (besldea the ba8ic land 
tax and tithe) ranging trOll labour servlce on Hudad lands 
(belonglng to the Emperor, nobles, etc.)76 to the payment ot 
due. on the marriage ot their aons .,;od daughters and the com-
memoration ot a death 1n the taa1ly.?? Slnce the right or 
Gult vaa held al..,s at the pleasure ot the grantor, an~olnt­
ment to the ~o.ltlon ot Gult va. regarded a. a passport to 
wealth - an opportWllty to aake ha7 vhile the 8UD ahined .. 
~8rticu1ar17 aince the 0u1t holders were not, even in theory, 
held to any aervice to the peasantry. In a 8ystem which ac-
knowledged only the dlvine right ot k1ngs, the peasante were 
treated little 1e88 than ·c .. els l , to be loaded and reloaded. 
To this day, the peasant tolls under a system marked by a 
glaring abaence ot mutuallty in the holding and exerc1sing ot 
right8 and obligatlons. The ueasant's i8 the duty to work, 
~roduoe and relinquish a good deal of the fru1ts ot his work. 
Gult waa merely the most lmportant torm ot relationship be-
tween the tillers and their overlords and between the latter 
and the Emperors. There are other less important and les8 
pervasive re1stlonabine round to th1s day in a modern dress. 
In the North, the lowest in rank, 81Ilongst the 81)'J)ro-
priator8 ot surplus i8 the Chika-Shum (a veritable reminder 
ot the Engli8h -revee~ Wh08e nower comes trom hie hereditary 
nossesslon ot local adm1nistrative functions. Th18 nerson 
1. not 80 much a member of the feudal nobilIty AS the llnk 
between the Government and the ~ulatlon livlng on the 
land. 78 He obtaina such authority noraal1y by selection trom 
among the famllle8 whose anceators flrst settled the land In 
a T,)8rtlcular area. Being from the area., hi8 local knowledge 
has been, aa Perham saya, -the stabillzlng factor In A system 
In which changing governors, roving armies, and a distant 
Emperor 1)181'ed the more dramatic, but often the more super-
tlclal uart8.-19 In return for this Important service, and 
by virtue of hi8 primAcy in local aftairs, he Is entltled to 
thls day, at least 1n Begemldes Province, to collect some 25 
kilos of cereals tram each tl1ler 1n the area over whlch has 
Jurisdlction. 80 
Above the Chlka-ShWD, and more Imnortant in rank, was 
the Fereaegna (llt.horseman) who recelved am8h~ (1/5 ot the 
~roduce ot the uea8ant). This nerson had a180 the rIght to 
exact labour service tor the cultIvat10n ot hls lend, the 
construction of his hou8e, etc. and the rlght to demand col-
lectlve glfts trom the 1)eS88nts on feast days, ell In return 
for mliltary servlce In tlmes of war, and malntaining lew end 
order in neace tlmea. 81 This tenure form hAS survived some 
ot the changes wrought on it in the last thlrty to forty years. 
Today, the FeresegnA ls used only to malntsin law and order 
In the rural areAS where nollce forces are not thought to 
be adequate. 
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As we 1nd1cated ear11er 10 Chapter II, consequent to 
the oonquest ot the Southern halt ot the country, two-th1rds 
ot the land was oontlscated trOll lts orlginal owners, and 
dlvided into several categorles suoh a8 to sup~ort all that 
'large proportion of the population which had withdrawn itself 
troll work" 1n the North and, a large pro-port1on ot cooptees 
ot the same denoalnation ln the South. As ln the North, Gu1t 
and R1ste-Gu1 t became the, archetypal torms ot re1at1ons ot ap-
pro1)riat1on and author 1 t7 1n the South. The Church too, be-
came once again the verltable reciplent ot large Gu1t eatates 
whlch it, 1n turn, dlstributed amongst lts lIe.bers in return 
tor ecc1eslastlcal servlce. In turn, the latter parcelled 
out thelr ho1d1ngs to the DlUch abused and 18lpover1ahed share-
oroppers. 
The institution ot roresegnet which 1n the North en-
titled the 'horsellAn warrlor' to collect several dues and ob-
ligationa tro. the peasants Y8S in the South converted 1nto a 
right called Maderia to hold land trom the Crown for 88 long 
as the right holder llved and contlnued to render m1litary 
servlce.. Be1ng by profe.slon mostly a tlghter And not a 
cultivator, once agaln the taSk or productive work WAS lett 
to the t11lers ot the land. 
Aa a result ot • ~roce •• ot modernlzat1on that was 
started some torty years ago, the above relAtions or a~nro­
pr1atlon and authorlty have undergone certain changes. In this 
respeot, the aaJor change has been the instltutlonalizat1on ot 
the relations or authorlty in an autooratic system or 
bureaucracy, and the re1at1ons of anpropr1at1on 1n a system 
of egr1culture1 lend taxation. As such, todey, Gu1t rights, 
for instance, do no longer carry with them the authority to 
administer an area or to di8~ense Justice. 
With respect to the a~propri8t1on of suroluB, however, 
albeit now in the torm of taxes na1d in cash, the system has 
remained substantially the same. Although we do not nossess 
now any data on the amount of appropriation in the form of 
tax, the following table may g1v~ a rough indicat10n of the 
major surviv1ng toras of appropriation- and the extent of 
it in the a.aaured areas of ten out of fourteen nrovinces 
of the country. 
* To be aure, Proc1amat1on 2)0 ot 1966 had abolished, seve 
1n reapect of the Church, Qu1t, Riete-Gult and Biseo. In 
fect, however, such rights continue to belong to their 
holders. 
DISTRIBUTION OF MEASURED LAND ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TENURES (1n Gashal of 40 ha.) 
Church H1ete 
Province Gebbar Semon Gult MenglBt Mader18 gult SlB80 Gu1t Total 
Shoa 46271 11688 S66 10515 ~135 4701 8450 89 (53.7) (1).6) (0.7) (12.2) 8.6) (5.4) (9.8) (0.1) 86188 
Aru8al 17022 9699 7085 1099 1399 4779 (41.2) (2).5) (11~1) (2.6) (3.5) (11.7) 41241 
We10 6475 1074 
-
8 
-
35 7918 (81.8) (13.6) (0.4) (0.4) 
Well ega 219:37 4254 36 15898 1823 457 6777 
-
49481 (44.:3 (S.O) (0.1) (:32.1) :( 3. 7) (0.9) ( 13.1) 
Herarge 7697 2861 2989 238 3026 
- -
17092 (45.1) (16.7) (17.5) (1.4) (17.7) 
Illubabor 14307 15S1 6474 1857 289 4532 
-
2906,5 (49.2) (5.3) (22.3 (6.4) (1.0) (lS.6) 
Kef, " 26355 1921 61 2178.5 458 1297 1360 - 59286 (44.4) (,. :3 (0.1) (46.9) (0.8) (2.2) (2.3) 
Gemu Gor,., 2386 171 6 11150 
-
9 
-
14322 (16.7) (5.4) (0.0) (17.8) (0.1) 
Sid8mo 20692 1596 
-
21~69 1027 1343 628 143 (42.8) (3.:3 ) (4 .5) (2.1) (2.8) (1.3) (0.3) 48431 
Bale 2.5081 1280 11992 48 
- - --
52466 (47.8) (2.4) (22.9) (0.1) 
Total 188223 34699 675 115457 968~ 12520 26535 267 40,5490 
(~6.4) (8.6) (0.2) (28.4) (2. )(3.1) _( 9. 5) (0.1) 
Source: Cond~nsed!MLR De~,.rtm~nt of Land Tenure (1971). 
~ 
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The table doe8 not 1nc1ude the 8ize ot the areaa with1n the 
appropr1ative reach ot the numerous churches and pr1vate in-
dlvldua1s 1n the Northern provinces, since here the system ot 
taxat10n is not baaed on 1and measured 1n un1ts ot a ga8ha. 
Nor doee it include the right8 of these persons or the churches 
ln the unmeasured areaa ot the South ltse1t. 
It ahowa, however, even It roughly that the following 
righta pertaln to variou8 claase8 ot ~eop1e and various 
church eltabli8hment8. 
1) The Church enjoys two Borta ot rights. On the one hand, 
lt i8 peraltted by law to collect and retaln tor its own uee 
land and educat10n taxes, at':"! the rates ot taxat10n the Gt:lvern-
ment haa laid down in relpect ot other lands, trom persQns who 
themselvea own such land8. !he rights ot the churche8 to enjoy 
luch taxational author1ty 18 known as Semon. In this regard, 
the Church 1s rea11, a Government within a Government. Notloe 
the 8ize ot land area to which Semon extend8. It only the 
land tax, and only tor Shoa Prov1nce, were converted into 
tlgures, the amount ot B,uch tax alone would total to someth1ng 
in the order ot Eth.$ 1116888 g.8haS x 1S or 10 or S.* 
On the other hand, the Ghurch has the r1ght to own land 
tor itselt - land wh1ch lt in turn dlstributes among its eccle-
slastical aeabers trom whoa 1 t col1ecta ecclesia.stlcal serv1ces, 
• The .. ount ot land tax on a ga8ha ot land 18 Eth.t1S, 10, 
and S tor terti1e, e.al-tertile and poor land re8~ectively. 
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and agricultural income and education taxes. The right of 
the Church to hold land under such arrangements is known as 
Church Gult. However, the Church itself does not pay land 
tex, wh1ch in theory is imposed on all lands. 
2) Similar rights enjoyed by private ~erson8 are known by 
different names 8S Gult, Riste-Gult and 8isso.* Although 
quite distinct in historical origin, the content of these 
rights appears to be identical today. They 8.11 refer now to 
the right of a 1l,ereon to collect, from llUldowners wi thin the 
area to Which his right extende, the land tax of Eth •• 15, 
10 or 5 after he has na1d a 8tralght rete of $3.,50 to the 
Government. 
Mader18 tenure has been, beginning with 1945 Ethionian 
calende.r, nermi tted to crystallize into lnd! vldual ownershin. 
Yet, even now there remains a large number of holdln~e under 
this form. Because it was only th~ use and enjoyment of the 
lend that was granted to the holder of such r1ght, he never 
had to pay land tax. Con8equently, even now after hie ri;rht 
has been converted 1nto full ownersh1~, he nays no land tax. 
In terms of the size of a"DprO~r18tion, the most 1mnort-
ant category of re18t1onshi~s 1s Gebbar (individusl ownershln). 
Today, the significance ot this term lies merely for tax 'Pur-
poses, i.e. the owners of such lends do not pay land or other 
* The differenoe between Rlete-Gult and 5i8S0 anueare to be 
merely one 1n origin end the rank of the rec1nient. 81880 
right seems to have been given to nersoneof inferior rank. 
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taxes to churches or private individuals in the torm ot Gult 
or R1ste-Gult. When th1s character is reaoved from thi8 cate-
gory, however, lt becoaes obvlous that the rlghts ot owners ot 
such lands are not d1tterent trom those owning lands subject 
to Semon or Gult. In this 8enae then, the a.b~ category ot 
relationshiJ)8 i8 IDOre J)ervasl".. than the table above indicate •• 
The model ot relationehlps 'that _erge. tro. this obeerYatlon, 
then, i8 that at the bottom ot the 80clal relationa of produc-
tlon we have the landless and saal1 ~art-owner. and ~t­
renters. Above thell are the landlorde who are, as the analy-
als on tenanc1 showed, the a~roprlator. ot teudal rent, tithe, 
te •• , etc., and above the landlOrds are the Gult, Riate-Gult 
and S1 •• 0 holders who appropriate the surplus product of the 
tillers in the tora ot taxes. This doe. not .ean, bowever, 
that the latter are Dot landowners the.ee1vea. In tact the 
converee 1. true. The point ls simply that while the actual 
cultivators ot the land are united b1, and have acce.8 'to the 
national eoonollY through, the .edlua ot share-cropping tenancy 
and small pea.ant prcrprletoNhil), the landlorde are united by, 
and have aoce88 to the .~lu. nroduct ot the cultivators 
through the .edlua ot the 80vereignty ot ownerlh1p, and the 
nobl1lt1 b1 Gult and 8uoh 8i.i1ar right.. SUch are the net-
work of 80clal relationships that govern the regulation ot 
labour, the appropriation and di8tributlon of the 80clal 8Ur-
~lus product aaongst those that oontrol the power8 of the 
State; and the.e are the re1atlona within the ~ramework ot 
whieh agricultural ~roductlon takes place. 
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CHAPTER tti 
I!plication8 tor Development 
In thi8 ~art, we 8hall oon8ider 80ae ot the major ~ 
plication. tor development ot the dominant torae ot property 
relationships: !!!l. and 9:!!!! in the North, and share--crop-
ping tenanc7, large land ownershlp and tradit10nal teudal 
rights pertaining to surplus appropr1ation in the South. Ot 
course, a paper such as this cannot ~retend to otter 1nter-
pretationa that are exhaustive or tinal. 
Renner baa well observed that every legal lnstitution 
is designed priaarily to enaure the ind1vldual ln society with 
hi. .eens ot reproduotlon, hi. 8ubsl.tence, however meagre, 
tor plainly the 'preseryat1on ot the species is the natural 
law ot every 80clal ord.r l • 82 In this regard, !y:..!! i8 at once 
the eoonomic and legal lnatitution whicb aerve. tbls function. 
By the .... token, 80 1a abare-cropplng tenancy - the inBtltu-
t ion through the ae41wa ot which the landless p •••• nt in the 
South, and eyen 10 the North, partlc1pates 1n the product1on 
ot tood, and the distribution and conauaptlon ot It. Juridi-
cally, the 4itterence b.tween the two llea 1n the amount of 
power and llbert1es the tormer r1ght gives a8 opoo8ed to the 
latter. Eoonoalcall7, the latter institution otfers no secur-
ity or acce •• to any def1n1te source ot income wh1le the boast 
ot the ln8titutlon ot Rlat ia ita dlstinctlve quality a. a 
guarantor ot 80m. land, howev.r llttle. Bence, the ideologi-
cal boast ot the Northern pea.ant: Ito be landles8 18 to be 
· . 
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aub-human· even though in teras ot the income be gete trom 
his land, he m1ght be no Blore-human· than his Southern 
counterpart. Be that A8 1 t •• 1', the ~rocea8 by which the 
pea.ant ln both area • .., become progreaslvely les8 ·sub-
hUllan- 18 a function ot the nature or development in whlch he 
must be read, and willlng to participate. And When viewed 
trom the need. of .uch development, nelther the lnatltution 
ot R18.t nor 'that at tenancy hold proal.lng prospecta. To an 
anal1818 ot th ••• ~tments both lnst1tut1ona ~re8ent we 
shall now turn. 
A. Slze ot Fara 8tructure and Technlcal SaCkwardnee. 
By tar the most aerious consequence ot the Riat sYltem 
la lts capacitl to prec1~1tate literally ml1110n8 ot emal1 
alEed hold1nga. Slnce it 1s • baa1c nor. of th1s .yatem tor 
the otf8Prlng of a !!!! owner to dlv1de and lubd1v1de progres-
81vely the lnherlted land equally amongat them, and aince it 
1a the rule to lnher1t land on both 11nes ot deecent, -peasant 
holdlnga are found not on11 1n s .. ll 812e. but a180 acattered 
1n one or 8everal v11lage.. ~e result ls dWarf holdings ot 
usually no .ore than halt a hectare or 1ea8. At a time where 
land 18 no longer plent1ful and I-ural over-population ever 
more rlslng, holdings are correapondlng11 ever more dwlndling 
1n alze. The exodus ot peasante tram Welo Prov1nce 1nto what 
they belleyed or were led to belleye to be unoccupied land in 
GoJJam Proy1nce 18 • ca •• in point. So 18 the case or hun-
drede ot poor pea.ante, part1cularl1 tram Tlgre Provlnce, 
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tlooklng lnto Addie Abeba and other cities. In these and 
other prov1nces in the North, oenturies of cultivat10n has, 
additionally, 80 aap~ed the fertility or the 8011 that the 
effort of the peasant on so min1scule hold1ngs 1s hardly any 
more oompen •• ted. 
In his work Amhara Land Tenure, in a miniscule region 
1n the North, Allen Hoben has attempted to disprove the obser-
vation that many peasants in this region are land-poor by 
claiming that • with the exception ot artlsants, tormer 
slaves and strangera ••• , most tarmers are able to obtain sub-
stantial amounta ot land rent-free n• a, He torgets, however, 
that "80clal institutions are a8 much 1mportant as available 
land in determining whether or not peasants are land-hungry ... e4 
If he means by "land-poor l that generally ~eaB8nte are not 
entirely without land, however small, the point is eas1ly con-
ceded aince, a8 we saw above, the great merit of the B!!! 
system 1s its c8-paolty to prov1de everyone ~·lth Ii r1ghtful 
claim with 80me land and thus w1th some secur1ty for subs1s-
tence. The question, however, i8 the quality of life that 
suoh land assurea the ~easant. As Hoben h1mself must adm1t, 
better quail ty lite 18 8. functlon ot more and better land. 
Hence the numerous d18~ut.8 and endless l1t1gat1on over land. 
The B!!! By.tem 18 a180 an 1mpediment to the tuller ut1l1za-
tion of the labour resources of the individual and his family 
members and the expan8ion ot agr1cultural activities on 
rational Sizes of lanc1.. S1nce the agricultural sector 1s 
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characterized by such a torm ot labour organization, i.e. 
many petty individual oentres or ~roduotion with virtually 
no organio connection between the one and the rest, there i8 
very lltt1e dlvlsion ot labour, and still le88 need for adopt-
ing modern ~roduotive methods 8uch as meohan1zation and the 
expans10n ot the internal market. 8S From this perspective, it 
should be obv1ous that sign1f1oant technical progres8 1s a re-
qulrement that accompanles the proper organlzation of the 
torces of produotion ot both land and labour. W1thout this, 
1t 1s only natural that the Ethiopian peasant Just as h1s 
counterpart everywhere (except the Japanese peasant, and then 
only once)86 should continue to use the same methods and in-
struments ot cultivat10n in a repet1t1ve and orthodox fashion. 
Hence too, the conservatism ot the peasant and hie aversion to 
everything that 1s new. 8? 
The Hi!! syatem 1s inhibit1ve of expanded production in 
yet another sense. The t1me wasted, the extra expenses incur-
red 1n tarming disoontinuous and amall plots ot land, the end-
lea8 litigation arising over claims to land and boundaries 
and the resultant social conflicts are the veritable conee-
quenc8s ot a system ot property relationships that merely en-
Bures the subsistenoe needs or the family and the appropria-
tion by those who have claims to the pessant's produoe. In 
this senae, what the ~ system does is to perpetuate poverty, 
limit the extent to which the peasant partiCipates in the 
market, and inhibit the prooes8 of capital acoumulation pre-
Cisely because agricultural operations are oonducted on very 
· . 
8mall holding8 1ncapable o~ yieldlng larger 8urpluses tor 
more production and oonauapt1on, and reinvestment into agri-
culture or other sectors ot the economy. Even tor those per-
sons who, by maninulating the inherent weaknesses ot the sys-
tem or eTen by legitimate means, acquire large enough lands, 
the tact that auoh lands may usually be had only 1n ditferent 
parlshel haa meant that it 1s imposs1ble to operate such lands 
88 a unit in order to rat10nalize agricultural operation8. 
Assuming that there are elements in the soclety who are 
interested and have the economio capacity to engage in a 
rational and more productive agr1culture, the method ot distri-
but10n ot land, the 1deology ot the system which excludes the 
possibi11ty ot the 8a1e ot land, and the tact that Ethiopian 
Feuda118m gave the feudal c1a8sea tew or no rights in lend 
means when viewed genetically, that on the one hand these 
classes oannot even nov de~r1ve the ~ea8ant ot h1s means ot 
product1on and, on the other, that rules ot the Rist sy8tem 
do not ~erm1t eas11y the pract1ce o~ soc1alist agr1culture. 
Oonsidered in this light, it i8 possible to argue that one of 
the reasona tor the success of the lords ot the manors or their 
ta,rmers in medieval England in undertaking the enclosure move-
ment was the nature ot the rights these classes had in the 
land. SS It was muoh easier for the Engl1sh landlords and 
yeomen to enclose on the ~oor peasant, given the economic 
condit1ons such as 11 prosperous wool trade whleh oa1led tor 
such a mov •• ent. 89 than tor their Ethionian counteroart8 who 
enjoy no similar r1ghts 1n land 1n the Northern part ot the 
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country. This 18 not to say that depriving the pea.ant of 
hie means of production tor the ~ro8perity ot capItalIst 
agr~eu1ture is what i. needed. That alternatIve, 1n the torm 
or proposal to ·indiv1dua1ize· property in land, has already 
bee~ ~eddled to the Ethiopian Government by foreign advisors, 
as such a proposal would, 1n and ot it8e1t, accomplIsh 
more than the documentatIon ot land r1ghts in IndivIdual 
namea, and a8 it, even it suoh proposal were to accompl1sh 
more, suoh 8ocompliehment would be in the interests of the 
broe4 ... se8 ot the poor ~eople.90 On the contrAry, such a 
proposal has lIere1y the advantage tor those with money ot 
depri.1ng the peasant of his land and oonverting him either 
into an agricultural worker, a 1and1es8 peasant or an entIrely 
Jobless person. 
~e experience gained in the Chilalo Agricultural Deve-
10p .. nt Unit ooncretizes 80me ot the implIcatIons outlined 
above. In this project area (1n the South), where a system ot 
more individua11zed ~roperty, although. not completely liber-
ated trom feudal trappinga, 1a the dominant mode ot relatIons, 
haa been hlghly tacl1itatlve ot the riae ot cap1talist rela-
t10ne in agr1eulture. 9l Here, with the advent ot 8 package 
program ot agricultural and market1ng serv1ces (tractors, 
fertIllzers, etc.) the landowning class wae quick to consp1re 
with an emergent clas8 or contract farmers 1n order to evict 
the share-crop:oera and oonsolidate small hold1ngs to sizes 
appropriate to the aval1able technology.92 In other worde, 
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the tact that in the South the tillers ot the land are not 
necessar11y the owners ot it has meant, econom1c cond1t1one 
perm1tting, a much treer leeway tor the landowners themselves 
and/or ,,1 th the alliance ot oontract tarmers to malte the 
trans1tion to a new mode ot production. As well, it has been 
much eaaier tor international development agenc1es such as 
CADU, AID and the lBRD to become catalysts 1n this ~rocea8 in 
the areas ot the South than in the North preCisely because ot 
the ditference in the degree ot individualizat10n in the 
nature ot property relationah,ipa between the two regions. For 
these agenCies, the system ot property relat10nships 1n the 
North ia aeen as anathema to the starting ot "development" 
projects which have as their pumose the catalyt1c introduc-
tion ot capitalist relations. Ansrt trom the undesirabi11ty 
ot the consequences ot such relat1ons, the system ot inter-
national intervention 1s likely to generate ana. perpetuate 
uneven development within the same country.. That appesrs to 
be the reason tor t,he current tlurry ot package progr8me. of 
"development" in the South and the v1rtual absence ot similar 
programs in the Northa 
1·1any ot the consequenoes tor development outlined above 
8.p1>1y ,,1 th equal torce in the Southern halt of the country 
too. Even though there i. a h1gh degree ot concentration of 
• For th1s po1nt, I am 1ndebted to Protessor Donald Harris 
or the Department ot Eoonomic8 ot the Univers1ty ot Wiscon8in, 
Hadison. 
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ownership here the size of ownershlp ls unimportant to the 
mode or its use. In other words, slnce landownershlp, es-
pecially when it ls concentrated, ls dlvorced trom farm man-
agement - in Ethlopla he must indeed be an exceptional land-
lord who 8011a hia 80tt handa 1n the dirty cycle ot agrlcul-
tllalwork - concentrated ownership 18 operatlonal1zed by 
"renting out· 8mall plots ot land to individual ahare-croppers 
on the basis ot verbal agreements. In terms ot the size ot 
tarm structure and the petty individual nature of agricultural 
product1on and the consequences ot these on ca~it8l accumula-
tlon, fuller labOur utilization, dlvialon of labour etc., 
the tenanted holdings ot the South are-as much irrational as 
the small owned holdings ot the North. 
Share-cropping tenancy has other consequences that 8,re 
too well~known. The share tenant who pays halt or more at 
the produoe to the landlord will not 1mprove the land or 8~ply 
any extra labour or capital unless he is convinced that his 
extrA in~ut wl1l bring hlm a return more then twice its cost?3 
In very simple terms, what this means 11 that a share tenant 
who 1ncurs a production coat ot say, a '100 will have to ex-
pect a return more than '200 to Justlfy his effort and invest-
ment, otherw18e his own returns w1ll at best cover his ex-
penses which neither will increase his income/nor compens8,te 
his extra work. 94 Moreover, under conditlons or insecurity 
And teudal eubservience 1.e. under conditions which permit 
the landlord to eee himselt a8 80vereign and the tenant as 
always 8ubJect to his whims and caDrlce, the tenant is not 
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l1kely to experiment and innovate. The resultant lack ot 
technioal backwardne8s 1s particularly aggravated by the tact 
that, atter the payment to his landlord of teuda1 rent, t1the, 
tees, etc., the tenant has little or noth1ng lett tor endea-
vora ln the d1rection ot technlcal progress. 
Some have put torward the argument that the Mnegatlve 
ettect ot ahare-cropp1ng upon agricultural development could 
be greatly reduced were input costs to be shared in the same 
proportion as returns, and that this would ensure the share-
croppers a marginal rate ot return comparable to that ot an 
owner-cultlvator."9S However, and as Erich Jacoby has cor-
rectly uolnted out, this solution makes only theoretlcal aense. 
In practice, a8 we saw above, since the landlord does not take 
part 1n the prooess ot agricultural production beyond parcel-
ling out land to his tenanta, such a solution tin almost cer-
tainly r~~ counter to the lnterests ot the landowning c1888. 96 
More importantly - and this i8 where this solutlon misses the 
polnt altogether - la considerable part of the costs, the 
cu1tivator1 s labour, cannot really be shared by the landowners 
without break1ng u~ the entire structure ot established 
tenure ayetell. 197 
The Juridical o~po81te ot the instltution of tenanoy or 
every varlety 1s ownerah1'P. 'l'radl t1ona,11y, the concept ot 
land ownersh1J) hilS been viewed aa a relatloneh1n between man 
and matter 1.e. between a ·property - subject" and a ·~roperty 
- object l •98 The petty peasant proprietor8h1~ ot the North 
mlght be 8ald to 1nvolve this relat10nship whereby the 
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institution ot ~ seoures the obJeot of farming i.e. the 
land, to the tarmer and the institution of succes8ion en8urea 
the cont1nuity ot labour and oonsumption and the reproduotion 
ot the species. In the Southern pArt of the oountry, however, 
where landownership is u8ually divorced trom produot1ve func-
tion, to own large areas of land is aotually to own large 
numbers ot people, particularly where the tenant, ae 1n 
Ethlopia, has tew or no alternative opportunlties and no eduoa-
tion which he might otherwise have used to improve his position. 
In the South it i8 not the ownership of land but the institu-
tion of tenancy that, tor the most part, lerves the tunotion 
of nroduotion ot tood and the regulation of agrioultural 
labour. Ownership ot land, on the other hand, is a title to 
feudal rent, tithe and tee8, and the source and basis of the 
soelo-economic and political power of those who have a mono-
poly of it and the consequent subJeotion of those who do not 
have it. And it is this institutionalized monopoly that i8 
called the State which decide8 the tate of those who are en-
gaged in productive work after having systematically excluded 
them from participat10n in the political prooesses of decls1on-
mak1ng. Small wonder then that in a 80c1a1 8ystem 1n which 
the productive work of the tiller of the land is viewed with 
contempt, even the opportunity to be elected to Parliament, 
(more aptly described &8 a "committee of landlords") 8S well 
AS it may be, is foreolosed by election laws requ1ring parlia-
mentary candidate. to be themselves the owners of land. 99 
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The fundamental quality or landownership as it occurs 
in Southern Eth1op1a is the sovereignty it bestows u~on its 
enjoyer to do as he pleases not merely with the people sub-
Ject to his dominat1on but also with the land end the income 
illeg1timately, unproduct1vely, and parasitically obtained 
from it. Hence, the reason tor 1eav1ng the land 1dle in the 
m1dst of general landlessness and abject poverty. From such 
a vantage point of absoluteness, 1t is irrelevant whether 
such use (or the absence of it) is inconsistent w1th the needs 
of development or the dignity of others as much as 1t is 1rre-
levant to the conception of ownership whether the owners of 
land work 1t themselves. The owner qua owner is under no duty 
to society: neither 1s he under any duty to work his land nor 
under any duty to exerc1se his nowera 1n 8 manner that does 
not compromise the needs end requirements of develonment o~ 
th~ welfare ot others. Consequently, not only do pert1culerly 
the large landowners often leave their lands idle but even 
when they parcel out their lands to poor shere-cro'O'Oers they 
use the inoome derived therefrom in a variety of unproductive 
ways prec1sely because, jur1d1cally speaking, ownershl'O as a 
legal concept being inditferent to the property - object ot 
1t gives the owner of such income the right to f1ddle with it 
just 8S he 1dles with the land. 
Thus, the unnroductlve nature of the ways 1n whlch sur-
nlua from agrlculture 1s used and the unproductive role of the 
spenders of such surnlus cs.n already be 8.nt1c1PBted from the 
not1on of ownersh1p itself, but more pe,rticu18r1y from the 
so 
le.rge landownership variety. For unlike in the North where 
small peesAnt proprietorshin servep, the tunctions ot nro-
viding the subsistence needs ot the tiller and the locus ot 
nroduction and consumption, in the South landownersh1p Is an 
instrument ot -poll tical rule. To the general prodigality 8.nd 
disdain tor nhyeical work ot the landownIng classes, the 
Ethiopian case is no exception.* Such characteristics have 
been observed in widely disparate societies, say as that be-
tween England and ChinA; and are the same characteristics 
that raised the ire ot Adam Smith and Ricardo. 
In a similar vein, PhilIp M. Raup has wondered why it 
is that: 
"Peradoxically, cultures that hElve 'Placed SOCial 
and economic (and noli tIcal) nremiums on land 
acquisition B.nd ownershl"9 heve not 8.,lways accom-
nnnied this with hi~h levels of land Imnrovement 
or agricultural production. Mloa . 
Al though there ie very little ''Oaredoxical'' a,bout it, the 
question is 8. valid one to raise in the Ethlonlan case too. 
As in other similerly situated countries, the landowning 
class does not engage in productive investment in egr1.culture 
or, to extend Raup'e quest1on, productive investment outside 
ot agriculture. On the contrary, 8 good deel of the economic 
eurnlus accruIng to it is spent - thanks now to the modern 
American end European amenities of lite - on consnicuous 
* The French nobility, for instance, used to sneak of 
Mderogation· i.e. 8 noble should refrain from taking un 
nroduct1ve work in agriculture or commerce. Else he 
derogated hie status. 
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consumption goods 8.nd services of all kinds: Mercedes Benz, 
medical check-ups, sumptuous residences, etc., and opening 
bank a.Ccounts outside of the country. Such attitude, 8S Paul 
Baran notes, dmay be to some extent irrational, nurtured by 
the tradit1on, style of l1fe, end sociel conventions pecu11ar 
to landed squires N• 10l To a large degree, however, it is 
explicable by the eX1stential economic re8.lit1es obta1n1ng in 
the country. In the absence of stud1es and data, such ex-
nlenation can only be tentative. 
Firstly, under cond1t10ns of 8 sim'Ole technology and 
cheap 8.nd abundant labour the landlord can hs.rdly nerceive 
the need to rationalize agriculturel production. l02 On the 
contrary, w1th rents, t1the, fees alres.dy h1gh enough for mB.1n-
ta1nlng his station in life - normelly sedentary bureaucrat1c 
l1fe - it 1s much easier and simpler for the landlord to sit 
beck 1n the towns and c1ties than gamble w1th h1s money on the 
he. zards of B.gr icul ture which norm8.1ly does not 'PB.y off returns 
quickly. 103 In this regerd, the expensiveness of imported 
agricultural machinery militates against investment in Agri-
cUlture. 104 In contrast, and particulBrly in the city of 
Addis Abeb8. where, '08rtly from the ellocation of 'Olen exoen-
d1ture, partly from nrivate investment in industries, end 
pertly from other government exnenditure, there is A growing 
concentration of economic develonrnent, the lendlords have 
found it exceedingly "Orofi te,ble to invest the income obtAined 
from agriculture in building modern anartment blocks to lease 
them to the official class and officials ot internetlonal 
· . 
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agencies. lOS On the other hand, foreign enterprise has pre-
emnted the non-agricultural sector - 15% of the pa1d-up caui-
tal belongs to foreigners. 106 This phenomenon h'lS, among 
other things, the consequence of cr1ppling the rise of an 
1ndigenous capitalist class 'Worth the n8me. l07 Why the land-
own1ng class does not 1nvest more 1n the non-agricultural 
sector than it does presently has to be inveetig8.ted further 
by more competent nersons. Tentatively, however, one can 
offer the tollowing hypotheses: 1) It may be that toreign 
enterorlse in industry is already providing the landowning 
class with handsome nrofits. 108 As the Ethionian manufactur-
ing sector is highly geared to the process1ng of food, tex-
tiles and beverages, it m1ght be that foreign enternrise has 
prov1ded lithe outlet for the 'Droduce of the 1a.nded eetetes. 1.109 
2) The primary concern ot th1s class 1s nollt1cal stabi11ty. 
We need not 'Drove here the connection between foreign enter-
prise (backed by the governments o~ their countries of origin) 
end the preservation ot the status quo. 
Secondly, the absence of a wide enough market in agri-
cultural products may go 80 fer to ex~181n the leck of enter-
,!)r1se on the 'DRrt of the landed c188ses. 110 As is well known, 
historically in the now Rdvanced countr1es of Eurone the ex-
'08n8&.on of the marketlll WIlS cruciel to the r1se of commer-
cial agriculture and the concomitB.nt 81l1811ce between the 
la,nded and the emerg1ng c8ni tAlist claese B. In Eng18.nd, for 
instance, the wool trede W8B decisive in setting the enclosure 
movement in gear and m8rk1ng the tr8,nei t10n ·'from the feudal 
· . 
conception of land 88 the basis of political functions and 
obligations to the modern view of it as income-yielding 
1nvestment. Hll2 In today's world of mult1-national corpora-
tions and imoerialism, this condition is no longer available 
to the landed classes 1n underdeve10ned countries. At the 
same t1me, the SUbsistence character of the economy and the 
absence of well-developed towns and cities has the effect of 
limiting the size of the internal market, and therefore limit-
ing the nroductive 1nvestment ~08s1bll1t1es of the lended 
c1a88e8. 113 
B. Sur,lus Annronriat1on and Ca~it8l Accumulation 
We have seen above how the netty owned holdings of the 
North and the similarly ~etty character of the tenanted hold-
ings of the South are lnconduclve to the nrocess of canital 
accumulAtion in 80 tar 8.8 they do not 'Oermlt 8 much fuller 
utilization of labour resources or the adoption of modern agri-
cultural mach1nery. Here, we shsll focus attention on the con-
sequences for c8~1tal accumulation of the concention of land-
ownershin and the ownersh1n of 1ncome der1ved therefrom, and 
trad1 tional relet10ns of 81lpropr18tion such 88 Gul t, 1·1aderi8, 
etc. 
As 18 well-known, every socio-economic system generates 
eoonomio surplus and the "Size and mode of utilization" of 
such surnlus determines Mthe rate Bnd direction of economic 
develonment 1n 8 country. Ml14 Admittedly ,·the quantificat10n 
of esnecie.lly some of the forms of such Bur-r>lus may be Ii 
· . 
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d1ff1oult task but not the conceptua11zat10n of 1t.* Accord-
lngly, Paul Beran has conce-ptualized economlc sur'OluB 1n 
terms of actual and potentlal categorles 01' sur'OluB. Accord-
ing to Bsran -- "Actual economic surnlus" is the dlfference 
between soclety's actual current out~ut and lts actual current 
con8~tlon.115 On the other hand, ·potent1al economlc sur-
plus" refers to ·the d1fference between the out~ut that could 
be produced 1n a given natural and technologlcal envlronment 
with the hel~ of employable product1ve resources, and what 
m1ght be regarded as essentlal consumptlon."116 N~edle8B to 
say,the realization of the latter category of economic surnlus 
ls predlcated unon the !)reauppoelt1on that there would_ he 8 
baslc reorganlzation of the production and distrlbutlon rela-
tions of society. With th1s assumnt10n 1n mlnd, let us see 
What may be cons1dered 88 categor1es of ·potent1al economic 
surplus" as they ere represented by the nro"Oerty reletionshlns 
e~18ting 1n Eth10n18 8t the level of relat10ne of a~nroprla­
tion snd authority. 
• The difflcul ties of qU8ntlf1catlon are quite 8.-part from 
the absence or inadeqUACY of statlsticRl lnformation, "essen-
tially reduc1ble to the fect that the category of the noten-
tiel economic surolus 1tself transcends the horizon of the 
existlng 80clal order, relatlng as it does not merely to the 
easily observable performance of the glven Bocio-economic 
org8nlzet1on, but aleo to the less readily vlsualized lmage 
of a more ra tlonally ordered soclety. II Ps.ul A. B8.ren, 
The_ Pol), t1cal Ec.Qnp!!y of Growt~. 1'.24. 
, . 
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8. The Conce'Ot of Ownersh1p and "Potential Economic Surplus" 
As we sew above, because of the socio-economic realities 
of the country and bec8use of the sovereignty with which prl-
vate ownership of land is imbued, the large landowners are 
permitted to wantonly refrB,in trom "Outting their holc.1ngs to 
nroducti ve use. As 11 reBu1 t t B.nd even though there are no 
d8t~ show1ng these, it is common knowledgel1? that arePB of 
lend 8_re e1 ther underut1lized or not utilized et 811. Ob-
viously, this state of utilization, or the leck of it, sets 
8 defin1te limit to agricu1turel nroduction and the nroceee 
of cenital accumUlation. The general st8te of cultivation in 
the country may be gleaned trom the following table: 
Land Use in Ethiopia 
Million hectares Percent 
-.-.---------------------.. ---~---------
Agricultural Land, 
of which: 
Cultivated land 
Pasture land 
SW8.mps 
Forests 
Barren or Built-un 
Water and Water Courses 
Total ~ea ____ _ 
--.-.--.---
84.1 
12.9 
66.0 
5.2 
8.8 
17.2 
12.1 
122.1 
.----
Source: Th1rd Fl ve Year Development PlAn (1968-73). 
68.8 
10.6 
54.0 
4.2 
7.2 
14.1 
9.9 
100.0 
The table ehowe that about 65% of the oountry's tote1 
area is potentially cultivable. However, of this amount only 
about l7~ is "Oreeently under cultlvstion. We need not quarrel 
here with the accuracy of the above dAta. Deenite its 
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limitations, it brings home one cerdinal tact: the irrat10n-
ality and WAstefulness of the system of property relat1on-
shIps which permIts the coex1stence ot large areas of under-
and un-ut1ll~ed land belong1ng to "Orlvate persons flnd the 
Government and the small tenanted and owned holdings ot the 
South and North. Obv10usly, even if this paradoxical and ir-
rat10nal situation may have been the result of some "histor1-
cal necess1ty" in the nAst, its continued existence has no 
justIf1cat1on. On the oontrary, 1t calls tor drastic re-
organization. 
The second major torm by which economic surnlus 1s dis-
sipsted 18 also tied to landownershi-o. Since l)r1vate land 
ownersh1n g1ves the ~ro~erty-subject the right not only to 
receive rent , tithe, fees, etc. but 8.lso to snend these unnro-
ductively (or leB8 productively than is desirable 8·8 in urban 
buildings) 1n consuicuous consumpt1on of all Borts, this cate-
gory ot economic surnlue too remsins notential. It 1s impos-
eible to bp precise on the amount of such surnlue. Consider-
ing, however, thet landlordshi~ 1s an ubiquitous institution 
in much of the country - about fifty-five nercpnt of the rural 
nOT)ulat10n are tenantsl18 - and. considerin~ that the value re-
presented by the payments of rent, tithe, fees, etc. to the 
landlord cla8s, amounts between 40-.55% of the -produce of the 
le,nd,119 the magnitude or such eurnluB must indeed be high. 
b. Tradit10nal Rights and Potential Surnlus 
Potential economlcsurnlue occurs here in the form ot 
taxes 'Osld to the Church And ,.,rlvate nereons. Conservatively 
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est1mated, the land area over wh10h the Churoh alone has 
r1ghts of taxation either in the torm ot Gult and Semon, and 
then only in the South 1s about l~ of the total land area:20 
In the North, 1n addit10n to these, there are numerous other 
forms ot surplus appro~r1at1on by whioh the interests of the 
Churoh are ~rotected. For instance, quite 8~art from the 
numerous serv1ces and dues ~arish1oners are ob11ged to pay tor 
the maintenance and construction of ohurch buildings, the 
Churoh ofAxum has, tor one, rights to collect produce trom 
the "Oeasants cult1vating what are known in Tigre Prov1nce as 
D1mit (cat) and Beklo (mule) lands. Such are lands whose 
tillers are required to relinquish a portion of their ~roduoe 
for the purchase, ostenSibly at least, of cats to chase away 
or k11l mice so the latter might not damage church ~ronerty 
such 88 vestments and liturg1cal books, snd mules for the 
8,nnu8,1 t)ageantry that 1s charaoteristio of the oelebrations 
of the holidays ot this 'Dsrt1ouls.r Church. This 1s only one 
out ot many Similar ways in whioh eurnlue 1s squeezed out of 
the ~easantry and dissinsted in eoonomically unnroductive 
ways in the m8intenance of the higher stra,ta of en idle 
nriestly c1a.8s. 
The tax revenue that goes to nrivate "Oersons in the 
forms of Gult, Riste-Gult, Sisso etc. is no lese considerable, 
and to the extent that such surplus is used in conenicuoue 
consumpt1on and for other nrest1ge-oriented ~urnoees, it too 
rem8.ine notential. Although the number of such 'Oereons is not 
known, the total land area to which their rights to collect 
texee of Eth.$15, 10 or 5 (after 8 straight rate of $3.50 is 
S8 
paid to the Government) extends, constitutes eleven ~ercent 
ot the total taxable land area,12l and then only in the South. 
At the seme time, other persons ere exempted trom the payment 
ot land taxes 8S in the South (ct. Maderia and Galla land-
holders) or ere given tax disbursements as in the North (cf. 
Feresegnas), or 8re permitted to collect nroduce trom the 
peasante tor their own use (ct. Chika-Shum). Occas10ned pr1-
merl1y by the absence or paucity ot mater1al and data on the 
moda11ties ot such 8ur-olu8 ap'Pro'Orlatlon, and the magn1tude 
ot potential economic surnlu8 they represent, the discussion 
has necessarily been much brieter than the importance the sub-
Ject deserves. Nonetheless, it has attemoted even 1t sketch-
11y the identlfication ot what might be regarded 8S some major 
sources ot potential economic surolus - sources that are 
necessarily connected with the nrevai11ng mode of nroductlon 
and the nature ot pronerty relet10nshins enpropr1pte thereto. 
It the irrationality and wastefulness ot this mode ot nroduc-
tion is to be helted, 8nd the ch8racter of our c1vl11~8tlon 
8nd progress to be meaningtul to the toll1ng ma.sees of "Oeo-ple, 
it i8 8 foregone concluslon that the exlst1ng rel~t1ons of 
nroductlon i.e. the existing nro~erty re19t1onsh1ps, must be 
reva.mped. To say that these reletlonsh1ps must be rev8.l!1"ed 
ra1ses the question of with whet they may be renlsced. To 
thiS, snd by way of conclusion, we now turn. 
.... 
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Conclusion: The Organizing Principle 
The fundamental oonclusion that emerges is that the 
goal of increased agricultural production - in the many-sided 
aspects in which we detined it - is im~osslble under the 
existing :property relatlonsh1-os.Fundamentally, this 1s so 
precisely beoause Ylroperty rele.tionshi-ps (and indeed society) 
ere not organized on the b8.sie ot nroductive functions. The 
absence of nroductive functions as the basie for nronerty 
organization 1s evident when one considers, 8S we hS.ve in the 
course ot the paller, that landownership And other relatione 
ot annro~riation are blatantly divorced trom use and trom any 
~roductive dutr to society. Fundamentally, and not simnly 
because they s"end the 80cilll Burolus "Oroduct wastefully, 
landlords And other traditional 8npro~rlators ot surplus such 
as the Church ~ertorm no product1ve work themselves thAt one 
18 tempted to ask: Would there be 8. decrease in agricultural 
nroduction, 8 disintegration in the organi28tlon ot agricul-
ture and labour were auch rights to cease to exist? Clearly, 
except for the callous and those b11nded by self-interest, 
when such rights are used tor the ~urnoee of ensuring An 1dle 
and paraSitic lite and the "Oerpetuetion of the dom1nat1on of 
nroductive nersons in SOCiety, their defense becomes not only 
a difficult task but also a ~indless one. 
Less evidently "functionless" but nonetheless unjusti-
fiable is the organization of agriculture on the basis ot li!!!. 
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Not th8.t it does not pertorm a produot1ve function in the 
sense of guara.nteeing the aubslstence needs of the tAmlly And 
1ts continuity at the level 01' the -oessant, but thAt trom the 
standnolnt of 1ncreased agrioultural nroduction 1t 1s 8. brake 
to 8 re.t1onlll agricultural and property organizAtion c81'lable 
of permitting tuller labour utilization, teohnical progress, 
and oa-pit8l accumulation. This is the confluence of the ir-
rationality - the lack of ~roductive function - of the nro-
perty relationships, at the level of the peasant, in the North 
as well as the South. At the same time, this confluence sug-
gests the necessity to look for more or 1es8 1dent1oa1 solu-
tions, on the basls of productlve functions, for both North 
and South rather than emohs8izing superficial differences and 
cha.racterist1cs. Yet, it ls precisely here that land reform 
of the v8.r1ety suggested tor Ethiop1a betrays a profound mis-
conoe~tion of the -oroblem. 
It w111 be recalled that 1n var10us 'Places 1n thls paper, 
we have hinted en t)s8sant that any pollcy of land reform which 
views aa !h.!. 'Problem the absence of lndlv1dus11zetlon of owner-
Bhl~ 1n land in the North 18 ent1rely misconcelved. We have 
Argued that in the North too there 1s 1ndiv1dual ownership. It 
has been our contention that the content of 'Drlvate ownershlt> 
of land, 8S any other r1ght, 1s histor1c81ly 8'Oec1f1c to the 
economic end social cond1tions U'Don which 1t 1s "Oredicated. 
As such, the ~ owner haa the r1ght to use and enjoy the 
lend, and the ~ght to dec1de what to do with the land 1n-
clud1ng the im'Dortent dec1s1ons of leav1ng the land 1dle -
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which is one element at the absolute ohe.raoter at individual 
ownership - and mL~ing all management and investment deci-
sions. Consequently, the abaence 01' land 8ales does not de-
tract the sovere1gnty 01' the owner. In this regs-rd, the owner 
1s 8ub,1ect to the control 01' neither any not10nal community 
nor that of any tam1ly nor even that 01' the state. G1ven that 
land 8ales and the Jur1dlcal not1on 01' oontract are struc-
tural 1ngred1ents 01' a developed market economy, the absence 
01' these ingred1ents 1n a much le88 developed economy does 
not mark the end of ownership. On the contrary, they mark 
the path that the 1nst1tut1ons ot pr1vate ownership traverses 
in the course 01' history. On this view, theretore, the con-
sciously or unoonsciously internalized notion 01' ownership, 
borrowed from a more mature economy, which equates ownership 
with s8le 18 ~rofoundly wrong. 
It is trom this pers'Dectlve thl'lt we will questlon the 
relevance 01' land retorm 1.e. 01' the po11cy of individual'1z8-
tion of the already lndiv1dualized torm 01' nronerty relatlons 
in the North. Conventional reform, conceived ln th1s sense, 
has been pushed 1n Ethio'Dla 88 a cond1tion for economic deve-
lopment. The mag1c wand to be waved to usher in such develop-
ment i8 sinmle as it 1s simplistic. It nroposee to document 
the right of ownershin in individual names although 1n soc181 
and economic terms land 1s held by individuel 'Dersons for own 
account - in the wake of which, it i8 be11eved, land w1ll be 
trf!ely sold. Fundamental to th1s nro't)o8al is the bellef thet 
88 :;'and now becomes saleable, the "more enterorielng" 'Cersone 
in eociety (meAn1ng really the ones with money) w1l1 develon 
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the lands more efficiently and more rat1onally. The equat10n 
is s1mple: 8 free market in land w1l1 bring about economic 
development. 
Quite apart 'from the 'Oerverted notion that equates 
Menterprising persons M with anyth1ng more than money-bage, 
the ~rol'08a1 begs the following tunde.mentel questions. 
Flrstly, it begs the questlon of where such enternrls1ng 
~ereon8 will emerge trom. In other words, absent the economic 
cond1t10ns snd the 80clsl att1tudes anpropriate for free m8r-
ket relations i.e. absent 8 market for the ~roduce of the land 
and without removing the 1mmob1l1zing effects of the reletions 
of aT)'propr1"t10n, it is difficult to see how the mere legal1-
zat10n of the sale of land w1ll usher in market rel~t1one. 
Ract it, not been for the absence of a wide enough m8.rket for 
the produce of the land and other ~roducts, the present form 
of J)roperty relAtions would have given way before our own eyes. 
Secondly, even if some -enterpr1sing nersons M, ~resumB­
bly bureaucrats 1n Add1s and elsewhere, were to be 1nterested 
in agr1culture, the pro~osal equates the consequent denriv~­
t10n of the mssses122 w1th economic develonment. The effects 
of enforcing such 8 'Oolley w1l1 certainly be the following: 
On the one hand, a greet maJor1ty of the neasents will be 
mAde destitute, w1th no land to work on any longer in egrl-
culture. or 8.ny o'Onortuni ties in msnufacturing, emAll to begin 
w1th and ~reempted as it is by foreign ente~rlse wh1ch o~ten 
employe non-labour intensive methode. On the other hAnd, 1n 
the 8beence of restrictions on the nower of the "enternrieing 
uersons" to do 88 they nlease with the 1ncome they obta1n 
trom agr10ulture 1.e. 1n the absence of any nlann1ng which 
would direct surplus to productive investment, lt is obvious 
thAt the 1mportant tasks ot CA1'l1t8l acoumulation and invest-
ment Are once more t1amboyantly skirted. 
What is the alterns.tivet To let the ex1sting property 
'~ 
relat10nships ,,1S, of course, just a8 bad AS to ettemnt to 
break them down with 8 contrived policy of creat1ng a m8r~et 
in land. The a1ternat1ve 11es ln a planned system whlch calls 
for the justif1cat10n of r1ghts 1n nroperty by the nroductive 
- SOCially and economically - function they nerform in society. 
It 18 1mpossible to be nrecise now on what might be reQ:'Brded 
as the content of this productive function. Nonetheless, it 
is poss1ble to outline some of its essential elements in terms 
of the nrob1eme we Bet out to exolain by the nature of nro-
perty relationshins. This means that rights in land (e.g. 
individual ownership) must be justified by the extent to which 
they enhance develonment, which in the case of agriculture is 
8 function of reorgan1zing farm structure, adonting new tech-
nology, cAnital accumulation And investment. Im"Olicit in 
this criterion of productive function is the belief that ell 
soc1ally and econom1cally relevant quest10ns A8 to Wh9t oon-
stitutes nroduct1ve fUnction must nertein to the State renre-
sent1ng the masses. 
Once it is agreed that rights in land must be justified 
by their productive funct10n, 8S def1ned by l'l8nning" ,1t is e 
re18tlvely eAsier question 8S to what form of nroperty is 
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more rAtion8l to eoonomic development. The ones thAt jumn 
into min~_ as the blllsie for R gus,ranteed And well-rounded .... 
etnd 8,ocle1 Justice" 'Orogress ~lre producer cooperetl vee J collectives 
etc. To discuss the edv8ntegee of these and related forms of 
agricultural Rnd !lro'Derty organization is beyond the scone of 
~ this paner.12) Suffice lilt. to 'Ooint out the rations.li ty 8.nd 
superiority of these torme in the o'DPortunity they ofter for 
"large-scale agriculture, the 8'P'Olication of technology, e 
more efficient labour utilization, ••• economy of available 
administrative end extension staff resourcee"124 And ·'a 
bull t-ln mechanism for saving, investment, and the 8,dminietra-
tion ot tax. "125 
Thus, if land reform 1s to be relevant 1n the North, it 
ought not to Justify the nrlnciples under which it reorders 
property by market forces which not only do not exist but even 
it they do Booner or later become run-away forces over which 
the majority of the ~e8santB will have no control. Given the 
underdeveloned nAture of the economy And the lnternetlone,l 
constraints to develonment such 88 foreign enternrise, 'Orice 
monopoly, trade limi tA.tione, the State must be the .2n!. orgRni-
zation in society on which must rest the responsibility for 
directing the rhythm end tem-oo of the economy on the bs,sie of 
nlanning and diecinline. The individual, Be sovereign over 
his nro~erty, now a8 under the prouosed policy is basically 
incepeble of undertaking such responsibility beyond his own 
nerrowly defined ends. 
In the South too, the principle of nroduct1ve functions 
6S 
a'Pl)liee with equel torce precisely becs.use the fundamental 
problems of increeeed agriculturel nroduction, the rationali-
zation of agriculturel and nronerty organizations end the 
alleviation of noverty ere common to both regions even though 
the relations of property are slightly different. Hence, 
here too one is forced to ask whet the conception end rele-
vance ot lend reform ought to be. 
As i8 well-known, ln many 'Oredomlnently agrarian eocle-
ties where there exists a gre8,t bifurcation between those who 
c oncentrete in their 'OR,trimony excess 1 ve landowners:"in but 
who perform very little or no nroductlve functions and those 
who are landless but who ~erform productlve funct1ons, land 
reform has been conoe1ved mostly as a 'Oolitical gimmick to 
satlsty the demands of clamourous peasants (and even ot 
docl1e ones) by break1ng Ul> large est8tes amongst them. This 
is done on the assumption that the redistr1bution of land 
provides the framework for future oo11tical stability 88 well 
as economiC growth and soclal Justice. Polit1cally, 1t is 
Assumed - that the breaking u~ of le.rge landownership will 
liberate the masses end help involve them ln the "rocesses of 
decision-making by Government. While 1t is difficult to deny 
here the advance ln 1')olltlcal 'Oartlcl'OAtlon such 8 meeeure 
may re1')reaent, 1t 18 imno8eible to regArd land redistribut10n 
813 being c8'Oable of reordering the '0011 t1cs.l structure of 8 
country where, Just as before, 'Oolltlcel "ower will undoubted-
ly remain - reinforced by 8 compens8.tlon scheme of one sort 
or another thBt usually goes with redietributlon - in the 
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hands of the .. exnro'Orie.ted ,. lendownere and othere in Govern-
mente 
Economically, it is fallaciou8 to think, as the pro-
'Oonents of land redistribution do, that the "breaking U'O ot 
large estetes, endo"tlng some landless 'Oeas8nte wl th 'Diots of 
thelr own, and freelng tenants of thelr opnre88lve obliga-
tione"126 would increase agriculture.l !)roduction, ensure 
s8ving and investment and ca.-pital accumulation. Here it 1s 
necessary to quote Baran At length: 
"Undoubtedly the immediAte effect of such measures 
would be a more or Ieee 8igniflcant increase in the 
ne888ntry's d1sno8eble income. Yet with the income 
level as low 8·S 1 t 1s, and as it would remAin even 
after the large estates had been s'Olit u~ into a 
multitude of dwarf hold1ngs and after the nayments 
of rent had been entirely 8.bolished, llttle if 8.ny-
thing would be saved out of the income increments 
••• Worse stlll, the narcelling of land would reduce 
the possib1lit1es tor 8ch1eving whet 18 obviously 
the foremo·st need 1n ba.okw8.rd countries: e. rs'Oid 
end substanti8l increAse of its aggregAte outnut. 
For an agr1cultural economy based on tiny ferms 
units would otfer 11 ttle opl)ortuni ty for an 1ncre8.se 
of productivity. To be sure, someth1ng CAn be 
e.chieved by 1mnrovement of seeds, by increased 
usage of fertll1zers, e.nd the like. As noted 
before, however, 8 major increase of nroduct1v1ty 
8.nd_ outnut de~ende on the noesih11i ty of intro-
ducing spec1a11zation, modern m8chinery, draught 
nower, 8 ~o8s1b1l1ty present only under conditione 
of large-sosle ferming."12? 
The reader will notice that Beran'e arguments ere couched in 
language - "s"011 tt1ng up large estates-' - that 8ssumes thAt 
large ests.tea in Ethio'Oi8 ~re onereted 88 a unit. Thet this 
1s not so for Ethio'01s. has been made clear in Chs")ter II. 
Yet, even lf large lends are not 80 operAted in Ethioule, and 
therefore there will be no "sn1i tting up", were Ipnd redis-
tribution to become a goel of Ethlo~lan 1)011cy. it is qu1te 
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obv1ous that since the effect of lAnd redistr1bution is to 
confirm the already enlit un tenanted holdings in ind1vidual 
ownersh1p, the 8.rguments are eque.lly well 81')nlicable. 
On A. legal 'Olane, 1n many countr1es the no11cy of le.nd 
redistribut1on, w1th all the above weaknesses And in snite of 
them, has been Justlfied by and carried out under the theory 
thet individual ownership must nerform 8 socie.l funct1on. 128 
ContextuAli2ed in this way, the effect of the nrinci'Ole of 
social function has been to look u'Oon latifundie with dis-
favour129 either because they ere not used nroductively or 
because, in anite of the state of their nroductive use, the 
consequence of the monono1y of landownershln 1s the denrivs.-
tion of the millions. As such, the nurnose of social function 
is to ~rovide the JustificAt10n for the taking of lend, often 
after a reserve hes been left for the nrev10u8 lsndownere, 
and the establishment of family farmsl)O - m1ll1ons of in-
d1vidual ferms which do not ensure increased agriculturel 
"Oroduction, emnloy modern machinery or guarantee saving and 
investment. For Ethloni8 to redistr1bute nronerty on the 
be,ele of th1s nrinc1-ole 18 to ren11cate the 'Pattern of owner-
shin in the North and to advance agriculture BS Bar8n would 
88,Y, li ttle beyond leaving the peasantry with more d1Eroos8,ble 
income to be anent unproduct1vely. In th1s sense, and in 
terms of the tiny size of the resultant ferms (eunhemlst1-
c811y celled "family farms") unlikely to nrovide the locus 
for increased agr1cultural 1')roduct1on, or 1f they were 
tavoured by nollcy to exist,very likely to be swallowed un 
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enywe.y by bigger fa.rmers, money lenders, lend speculators, 
etc., red,letrlbutlon on 8. Ufamily" bReis nerforme Ii tt1e 'Oro-
duct1ve funct10n and suggests the necess1ty, by the Stete, to 
orge.ni2e agriculture end nro'Oerty on cooperative, collective 
or related bases. 
Secondly, because the nrlnc1ple of social funct10n does 
not quest10n ~r1vete ownereh1n of land - 1ndeed reinforces 
it J - the consequence he-s been the entitlement of the land-
owners to cla1m and receive compensation in the course of a 
land reform program. Since the nurnose of land red1stribution, 
8 t least ostens1bly, is to readjust wealth, to break the be.ok 
of an unproduotive and paras1tic landownlng c18e8, one fails 
to Bee why compensat10n should be made - why the landowners 
should be perm1tted, 1n effect, to ralse nubilc tpxee for 
nrive.te use - t)art1cularly since redistribution is sought 
preCisely beoause nr1v8te ownershin of lend has fa1led to 
nerform its 80-called "80ciAl funct1on." Indeed, the actual 
t1ller of the land AS 1n Ethio~ia h88 'O&id eo much 1n liberty, 
dlgnity, rent, tithe, etc. that one 1s comnelled to ask if 
c Ompen88,t ion is not due the other way A.round. 1·~oreover, as 
Edmundo Flores s8.ye,eummeriz1ng the Mexican exnerience: 
"Judg1ng by the Mex1can exner1ence, 1t can be said 
that Rny attem~t to pay comnensation - excent sym-
bo11cally - leads to an insoluble solut1on ••• An 
agrarian reform needs to be followed by 8 vigorous 
effort to increase the rates of ca1)1tal formAtion. 
It would be self-defeating to take resources from 
1nvestment and give them to the old oligarchy, 
'Psrticularly if we consider that giv1ng buying 
power means ~utting in their hands more elements 
w1th wh1ch to f1nAnce counterrevolut1on."lJl 
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Our nurn08e is not to discourage land reform ner se 
but to raise the quest10n of whet tyne. If it 1s to be 
mean1ngful to the broad masees of the neo~le on 8 more last-
1ng baSis, to be oatalytio in releasing their creetive ener-
gles, to increase agrioultural production, investment and 
cB~ni tal accumulation, land reform must be grounded ln the 
nrinciple that agriculture must be organized around 8 !)ro-
perty form that ie justif1ed by the degree to which it per-
forms productive functions. In large -part, the questlon of 
what 1s produotive can only be declded by the State repre-
senting the mAsses. And in the final aoalysis, incressed 
agricultural nroduct1on, lnvestment, c8~itA1 8ccumu1etlon, 
etc. ere a functlon of cooperative e,nd collective forms of 
nroperty orgs_n1zat1on wh1ch encourage 1ndustry to look to 
egrlcu1 ture end agriculture to industry. In turn, these 8.re 
nos81ble only under nlsnning by the State. 
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